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Conservation servitudes (more popularly known as
"conservation easements")' are both an innovative and confusing land
preservation method for private individuals and organizations. They
allow private parties, at their own initiative, to acquire protection
interests (known as a "servitude") in the property of another. Although
this process sounds rather simple, attempting to create such an interest
exorcises many demons of centuries-old property law. Modem statutes
have come to the rescue in a majority ofjurisdictions; however, few if
any have been directly challenged, and the common law still remains a
lurking specter in those jurisdictions whose legislatures are less
motivated to endorse these preservation methods. The following
analysis attempts to provide a basic overview of the law of servitudes,
particularly as to how that law describes and applies to conservation
interests. These common law problems have not inhibited nonprofit
conservation organizations (land trusts) from acquiring a significant
number of servitude limitations on the lands of others.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSERVATION SERVITUDES
A. What Are Conservation Servitudes and Why Are They Used?
1. The Nature and Purpose of Conservation Servitudes
Conservation servitudes are, in essence, a privately created and
managed land preservation technique, that have become increasingly
popular over the past two decades. These interests have their origin in
the common law of property and present a viable alternative to reliance
* John Walliser is a staff attorney for the Pennsylvania Environmental Council. J.D.,
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 1997; B.A., University of Pittsburgh, 1993. The author
would like the thank Cyril A. Fox and Davitt B. Woodwell for their guidance and insight.
I use the term "conservation servitude," primarily to reduce confusion in subsequent
discussion between the various types of non-possessory interests that exist in the common law.
As will be discussed infra, there is no definitive understanding as to what in fact a conservation
servitude is (easement, restrictive covenant, or equitable servitude).
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on governmental regulatory regimes to protect environmental quality
and aesthetics.2
In essence, servitudes are contractual agreements between two
private parties, that give one party specified non-possessory rights in
the land of the other.3 These rights differ from typical contractual rights
in that "both the burden and benefit created by the servitude have the
capacity of 'running with the land' to [bind] successors of the original
parties if specified conditions are met."4 It is this intention to bind
persons succeeding the original landowner that distinguishes
conservation servitudes from other contractual arrangements.' The
ability of the agreement to "run with the land" is essential to further the
conservation purpose, in that it not only places restrictions on the
current landowner, but also purports to similarly bind all subsequent
purchasers of the burdened estate. It is this feature that has made
servitudes an effective and widely-used technique for private land use
conservation.6
The interest created by a conservation servitude is "negative"
in that it prohibits the landowner "from acting in a way that would alter
the existing natural, open, scenic, or ecological condition of the land."7
These servitudes do not allow the land trust physical access to, or use
of the property, with a possible limited exception for right of inspection
to determine compliance with the agreement.' Title to the property
2 One commentator, Susan French, states that governmental regulation has actually
increased the use of conservation servitudes. She notes two reasons: First, "public regulation
itself often uses private servitudes as tools of regulation . . ." and second, "the inherent
shortcomings of public regulation encourage private arrangements." Susan F. French, Toward a
Modem Law ofServitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL, L. REv. 1261,1263 (1982).
' See, e.g.,Edward E. Chase, Servitudes, 1 AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§6.01 [1], at 6-4 (Arthur R. Gaudio ed. 1994). In creating a conservation servitude, a land trust
pays a property owner (landowner) consideration in exchange for conveyance of the right to restrict
the amount and nature of development that may occur on the property (the "burdened estate" or
"burdened property").
'Id. These requirements are discussed in Section II, infra.
' See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1991), at ix
[hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 2].
6 Supra note 3, §6.01 [1], at 6-4. However, the requirements for "running with the land"
also prove to be the most problematic aspects of conservation servitude validity and enforcement
These difficulties are discussed in Section It, infra.
7 Karen A. Jordan, Perpetual Conservation: Accomplishing the Goal Through
Preemptive Federal Easement Programs, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401,407 n.27 (1993) (citing
Gerald Komgold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context ofln
Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEx. L. REv. 433, 435 n.4 (1984)). The difference
between "affirmative" and "negative" servitudes is more fully discussed in Section II[B], infra.
g Gerald Komgold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the
Context ofin Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEx. L. REV. 433, 436 (1984).
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remains in the landowner, and typically remains freely transferable.9
Hence, the "benefit" arising from a conservation servitude is the
assurance of continued environmental or aesthetic quality of the
property, while the "burden" is the inability of the landowner to alter
that quality. In this sense, a conservation servitude is a "use" restriction
- it restricts or prohibits certain future uses of the land or alterations to
the existing use. The common law provides three main forms for
private land use agreements that allocate non-possessory rights in the
land of another: easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes."°
Each form has its own unique characteristics and requirements for
creation, enforcement, and durability. One of the major obstacles to
common law enforcement of conservation servitudes is the
determination of which category to which they in fact belong.
2. Advantages of Conservation Servitudes
There are several advantages to both parties in creating a
conservation servitude.
a. Flexibility and Specificity
Because conservation servitudes usually are created by private
parties in an arm's length transaction, they present the opportunity to be
both flexible and precise. They allow the parties to design an interest
acceptable to all involved." This adaptability promotes "efficient land
use by permitting the sharing of land resources among different users
who acquire only the use rights needed, rather than a full fee interest,"' 2
and is of advantage to both parties.
To the land trust, "[u]nlike fee acquisition, which involves 'all-
or-nothing' preservation, [servitudes] need be no more restrictive than
necessary for the particular purpose for which the land trust accepts the
[servitude]."' 3 The land trust acquires (and consequently pays for) only
'Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common Law,
8. STAN ENV. L J. 2, 7 (1989). This is true even though the land is permanently burdened by the
servitude agreement. Id.
" See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 7, at 406 n.23.
"See supra note 3, § 6.01[1], at 6-4. Because of this adaptability to a wide range of
purposes, servitudes provide "a flexible as well as important tool in the management and control
of land." See id.
12 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (TH[RD) OF PROPERTY, Introduction, at xxi (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. I].
3 Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 10-11.
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what it seeks to protect.' 4 Further, this flexibility is of advantage to the
landowner, because as the servitude restricts only what the interest
holder has selected, it does not implicitly preclude all economically
productive uses of the land. 5
b. Permanency
An additional benefit of the conservation servitude, at least to
the interests of the land trust, is the perpetual nature of the restriction. 6
As noted by Timothy Houseal, conservation servitudes tend "to be more
permanent and more restrictive than zoning and land use regulations,
which can shift with the political winds."' 7 Often, this is one of the key
reasons why conservation organizations enter into these agreements, as
reliance on impermanent governmental regulation is by-passed by
private (and often more effective) initiative."
However, common law doctrines may enable the burdened
landowner to invalidate the conservation servitude interest at a later
time. Further, if specific requirements are not met for validation of the
servitude, the interest may be nullified from its creation by a court of
law. 19
c. Preferential Tax Treatment
For the landowner, an additional advantage of conservation
servitudes is potential income tax deduction, as well a reduction in
" See Melissa Waller Baldwin, Conservation Easements: A Viable Toolfor Land
Preservation, 32 LAND & WATER L. REv. 89, 108 (1997). Conservation organizations have lower
acquisition costs as they are not required to purchase unnecessary full fee interests.
" Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 11. See also Baldwin, supra note 14, at 106. For
example, the landowner may be allowed to maintain his residence and occupation on the land, even
though he cannot commercially develop the property.
16 This quality has also been one of the strongest criticisms of conservation servitudes,
especially in light of the traditional policies in the common law to promote alienability and
exploitation of land; discussed infra. However, such criticisms are in fact nothing more than
policy arguments, and run against other doctrines in the law such as freedom to contract; discussed
in Section I1, infra.
17 Timothy Jay Houseal, Forever a Farm: The Agricultural Conservation Easement
in Pennsylvania, 94 DICK. L. REv. 527, 532 (1990). Of course, susceptibility to political control
is a policy argument against private restrictions on the land of another, as it ensures democratic
control of land use. See Section II, infra.
" This explains the creation and success of conservation organizations at the national
(such as the Nature Conservancy and the Audubon Society) as well as the local (such as the
Western Pennsylvania Conservancy and the Allegheny Land Trust in western Pennsylvania) levels.
'" These doctrines will be discussed in Section II, infra.
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estate and property taxes.20 The possibility of property deduction exists
at both the federal2 and state22 levels. 23 This consequence benefits the
local government and communities as well, because conservation
servitudes maintain private ownership of land. Unlike fee acquisition
by a nonprofit or governmental entity, the property remains on the tax
rolls.24
d. Other Advantages
Other advantages cited by commentators are that conservation
servitudes are obtained through voluntary arm's length transactions and
are less arbitrary or oppressive than regulatory restrictions.25
Conservation servitudes avoid indirect costs to governmental entities
and the general public desiring to conserve land (such as the acquisition
costs of real estate and management costs associated with ensuring
compliance).26 Conservation servitudes also allow for the use of
property to be "established in a stable, readily understandable
manner."
27
3. Disadvantages of Conservation Servitudes
Conservation servitudes also present inherent problems. Of
significant importance to the land trust, a conservation servitude
requires managerial oversight. This imposes indirect costs on the
"' See Baldwin, supra note 14, at 107. See also Village of Redwood v. Bolger Found.,
517 A.2d 135 (N.J. 1986) (conservation easement given to insure preservation of open space was
comparable to easements or encroachments involving free public access to property,
notwithstanding fact that taxpayer retained exclusive access, and thus easement could be
recognized for real estate tax valuation purposes).
21 I.R.C. § 170(h), 2031(c) (1998).
"See, e.g. MD. CODE ANN., TAx-PROp. §§ 9-107, 220 (1996), N.J. STAT.ANN.
§ 13:B-7 (West 1996) (New Jersey);. PA. STAT ANN. Tit.72 § 5491.2 et seq. (1996).
2 This feature of conservation servitudes has produced a substantial number of issues
and problems which are beyond the scope of this analysis. For a brief discussion of valuation
problems, see Section t[A][3][a], infra.
u Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Authority for Federal Acquisition of Conservation
Easements to Provide Agricultural Credit Relief 35 DRAKE L. REv. 477,487 (1985-86). See also
Houseal, supra note 17, at 532.
" Hamilton, supra note 24, at 486.
'6 See Komgold, supra note 8, at 443.
27 Hamilton, supra note 24, at 486. Indeed, a conservation servitude may be invalidated
on the basis of ambiguity. See Parkinson v. Board of Assessors of Medfield, 481 N.E.2d 491
(Mass. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 495 N.E.2d 294 (Mass. 1986) (If instrument granting
[conservation] easement does not describe servient land with precision required to render it capable
of identification, conveyance is absolutely nugatory).
1997-98]
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organization, which must ensure that the servitude, for which it paid
valuable consideration, is being observed by the current landowner. In
addition, where there is a violation of the servitude's terms, the land
trust must either reach agreement with the landowner or bring an action
to enforce the servitude in court. There aretwo other primary legal
concerns for the land trust: (1) questions of enforceability, given
common law hostility to in-gross benefits that restrain use and
alienation of property;2" and (2) issues of durability over an extended
period of time where circumstances surrounding the burdened land
substantially change.29
a. The Problem of Valuation
Although tax deductibility may be one of the advantages of
conservation servitudes for the land owner, it may also prove to be one
of its difficulties. Creation of a conservation servitude "requires the
appraisal or valuation of the property interest involved, which because
of the rather subjective, yet generally perpetual nature of the interests
restricted, may be hard to price."" This problem of valuation has two
main components. First, determination as to the fair market value of the
conservation servitude is difficult, due in large part to the uncertain and
unascertainable "value" of environmental preservation." The second
difficulty is that the appraisal process that a landowner must undertake
for the deduction is cumbersome.
2
B. Context and the Law of Servitudes
As noted by Susan French: "[T]he concept of interests running
with the land is elegantly simple, but the law governing servitude
devices is a mess."33 Indeed, despite the substantial amount of literature
28 Discussed in Section 11, infro.
" See 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, Thomas Edition § 62.18, 
at 526 (David A.
Thomas ed. 1994) [hereinafter Thomas). Discussed in Section fl, infa.
' Hamilton, supra note 24, at 487.
" See Baldwin, supra note 14, at 115. See also Robert W. Wood, Charitable
Contributions of Property, 20 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 196 (1993); Village 
of Ridgewood v. Bolger
Found., 517 A2d 135 (NJ. 1986).
32 Id.
" Susan F. French, Servitudes Reform and the New Restatement of Property: 
Creation
Doctrines and Structural Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 928 (1988). 
French observed that
"[tihe literature of servitude law is rich in derogatory epithets." French, 
supra note 2, at 1261 n.1.
Among the more "honest' descriptions that French notes include servitudes 
law as "an unspeakable
quagmire," (E. RABtN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY 
LAW 480 (2d ed. 1982)),
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surrounding the topic, the one safe observation of servitude law is that
it "remains a murky subject burdened with obsolete forms and rules
that have caused confusion and uncertainty."34 However, it is precisely
within this confusing context of law (and colorful observation) that
conservation servitudes must be evaluated.
1. Development of Servitudes Law
As with many other areas of the law, development of the law of
servitudes has reflected several underlying principles of society.35 Two
fundamental policies emerge that have influenced the development of
servitudes law: Protection of third parties and unrestrained use of the
land.
Essential to the formation of modem servitudes law are those
rules "allowing enforcement by and against parties other than those who
made the original agreement."36  Implicit in servitudes law is the
understanding that "[t]he rest of the world... is not a party to the
[original] transaction, and by ordinary contract rules cannot be bound
by it."37 These rules have been constructed to protect third parties
unrelated to the agreement, but subjected to its restrictions." At least
to some degree, the reason behind this development was the lack of an
effective and established recording system in England and the United
States, wherein the only ability of a prospective landowner to discover
restrictions on the land was to examine the property and question the
landowner. It has been argued quite frequently that the development of
an established recording system has, to a large degree, eliminated the
'confounding intellectual experiences," (Krasowiecki, Townhouses with Home Associations: A
New Perspective, 123 U. PA. L REV. 711, 717 (1975)), and a law with "rigid categories, silly
distinctions, and unreconciled conflicts over basic values." (C. HAAR & L. LIEBMAN, PROPERTY
AND LAW 909 (2d ed. 1985)).
' Uriel Reichman, Towarda Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179
(1983). 3 Reichman observes that "tracing the history of servitudes provides a vivid picture of
dynamic economic and behavioral patterns in American society." Reichman, supra note 34, at
1183.
36 Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55
MINN. L. REV. 167, 169 (1970). As noted by Richard Epstein: "In any system of property law,
a complete specification of rights and duties raises two separate questions. The first question
concerns the allocation of rights and duties between the parties to the original transaction, grant,
or conveyance. The second question concerns rights and duties of those participants against the
rest of the world." Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes,
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1354 (1982).
" Epstein, supra note 36, at 1354.
38 Therefore, part of "the complexity in servitudes law is due to courts' view that
unchecked enforcement of servitudes is dangerous." French, supra note 33, at 928.
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need for this concern for unsuspecting third parties.39
A second policy underlying the law's traditional prohibition of
servitudes law is exploitation of the land.40 This judicial and social
motive is reflected throughout property law, as in the law of adverse
possession. However, it would be unfair to generically label this as an
"exploitation" pursuit by the courts. It also reflects a more fundamental
societal goal of benefit equaling burden, where one parcel of land is
restricted in terms of growth or production, another parcel, or society
in general, should receive some benefit. As noted by Ross Netherton:
A popular axiom ... [is] that there are "no free lunches" in modem
society's choice of strategies for guiding land use and community
development. Every apparent right or privilege connected with land,
water or natural resources can be exercised only by paying costs
deducted from another facet of the community's store of resources or
growth potential.4 Of course, what constitutes the "best use" of the land
may not be the "most profitable" use of the land. 2
It is precisely this approach of caution and concern for third
parties, coupled with a traditional bias in the law toward unrestrained
use of the land, that has created the strict and somewhat subjective
requirements associated with private non-possessory interests.
Conservation servitudes theoretically work against both of these
principles and as a result, confront a deep current of law that has been
largely impervious to modernization and change.43 An additional
difficulty is that despite the widespread use of conservation servitudes
throughout the United States, there has been a notable lack of litigation
over their effect or validity."
This argument will be more fully explored in Section I, infra.
"See Reichman, supra note 34, at 1184 ([t]he decisions relating to servitudes reveal
the course of exploiting natural resources in this country....").
Ross D. Netherton, Environmental Conservation andHistoric Preservation Through
Recorded Land-Use Agreements, 14 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 540, 541 (1979).
42 See Section II[E][2], infra.
4' Susan French notes that in servitudes law "judicial controls have evolved in true
common law fashion over many centuries... the old forms and controls did not disappear, and
as the old continued alongside the new, the gradually accreting layers of doctrine became ever
more complex." French, supra note 33, at 929. See also Reichman, supra note 34, at 1184-85.
("The modem law of servitudes ... is to a large extent the product of decisions of nineteenth-
century courts.")
'See Baldwin, supra note 14, at 110. ("In several states ... no issues regarding the
statutorily created conservation easement provisions have been litigated .... Furthermore, when
issues pertaining to conservation easements are questioned in court, often the validity of the
easement itself is not challenged.")
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C. Introduction to the Problems
1. Value Conflict
The validity and enforcement of conservation servitudes rests
upon an enigmatic background of common law policies and rules that
both support and limit their application. Where the original parties to
the servitude agreement are in conflict, traditional contract law may be
applied. However, where "one or both of the parties to the action [are]
not parties to the original promise, different policies are present."'
Consequently, courts have qualified the ability of servitudes to run with
the land." The tension arising from these policies can be best described
as "value conflict." Gerald Korngold has observed that:
Privately held conservation servitudes ... challenge
the wisdom and creativity of courts and legislatures
because they present a difficult choice among
conflicting social values. Although authorization of
[conservation servitudes] reinforces freedom of
contract, promotes the benefits of private initiative,
and assists conservation of the natural environment,
other important social policies suffer.47
Arguably this tension in the law boils down to a single question:
"When should the law defer to the intentions of the various parties, and
to what extent should the law limit individual freedom of action?" 48 It
is precisely this question that has resulted in the formulation of the
various rules that define servitude law.
' Cyril A. Fox, Promises Affecting Ownership of Estates in Land, 1 (1997) (on file with
the author). Fox identifies three essential values in property law: (1) "a judicial desire to keep
titles to land unfettered (freedom of alienation)" (2) a societal need to allow binding
"accommodations among the owners or occupiers of neighboring parcels of land" and (3) "a
societal desire to make land 'productive."' Id.
'6 This is true even when the court would normally enforce the agreement between the
original contracting parties. See Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The
Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 615, 616 (1985).
"7 Korngold, supra note 8, at 435. Susan French also identified several of the general
policy conflicts involved with conservation servitudes wherein she states: "Servitude enforcement
... pits strongly-held values against one another. Values of freedom of contract, freedom from
dead-hand control ... values ofautonomy... freedom from restraints on trade and alienation, and
democratic values may all be challenged by servitude enforcement." French, supra note 33, at 931
n.13.
4Epstein, supra note 36, at 1353-54.
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2. Common Law Hostilities and Concerns
The common law has generally disfavored interests such as
conservation servitudes because they are deemed to impede land use for
the benefit of a single individual or entity.49 Consequentially, where
parties desiring to create a conservation servitude cannot rely on
statutory validation, they often face uncertainty concerning if and how
a court may enforce the restrictions.50 Because of the various
conflicting policies associated with conservation servitudes, the judicial
response has been ambiguous at best.5' An additional problem is the
confusion as to the exact nature of the property interest created by the
servitude. 2
The effectiveness and purposes of conservation servitudes
would be all but destroyed if their restrictions could not run to
successive owners of the servient estate." These uncertainties make the
use of conservation servitudes precarious, as the parties to the
agreement are forced to rely upon conflicting and often indeterminate
requirements and values embedded in centuries-old case law. 4 Perhaps
the most unsettling concern with conservation servitude validity is that
the questions arise when certainty is needed most -- when the land trust
wants to enforce the restriction.55 This may occur with a non-
conforming landowner or where the initial grantor has conveyed his
interest to another who "has received none of the direct benefits of
creating the [servitude], and who may not share the conservation 'spirit'
,,56
49 See Jeffrey A. Blackie, Conservation Easements and the Doctrine of Changed
Conditions, 40 HASTINGS L. J. 1187, 1193 (1988-89).
o See Dana & Ramsey. supra note 9, at 3. As noted by the authors: "Traditional
property law doctrines place restrictions on permissible types of nonpossessory interests in land,
and contain strict rules governing the enforcement of these ... restrictions. Under a pure common
law regime, courts would likely find conservation easements wholly or partially unenforceable."
Id. at 12.
s French, supra note 2, at 1265. French notes that "[b]ecause these devices are both
useful and dangerous, courts have responded to them with understandable ambivalence, allowing
their use at some times, for some purposes, for some people, and preventing their use for others."
Id.
52 Komgold, supra note 8, at 436. This issue will be discussed in Section II[D], infra.
3 See Berger, supra note 36, at 169.
Baldwin, supra note 14, at 109.
5 This issue is recognized by the proposed Restatement (Third) of Property: "The
serious legal question... is not what the stipulation purports to do; it is whether the law will give
legal effect to the stipulation when enforcement of the stipulation is attempted against third
persons." Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 5, at ix.
I Hamilton, supra note 24, at 504. It goes without saying that "the legal status of a
conservation [servitude] is most significant in terms of enforceability." Id.
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II. THE COMMON LAW: OBSTACLES AND ISSUES REGARDING
CONSERVATION SERVITUDES
This section will describe those requirements and policies
found in the common law that substantially affect the creation and
enforcement of servitudes. The first requirement is the intent of the
parties to the agreement, as it is the one clear prerequisite for the
running of all servitudes. Second are the distinguishing characteristics
and classifications of servitudes: Affirmative and negative, appurtenant
and in gross, and the easement, restrictive covenant, and equitable
servitude distinction. Third are the fundamental obstacles and policy
conflicts found within conservation servitudes as legal interests:
Benefits in gross, the touch and concern rule, contract versus
alienability concerns, and notice and the role of recording statutes.
Finally, there are issues of termination and duration, which have
become particularly important due to the focus and dependence of the
proposed Restatement on such doctrines as changed conditions.
A. Intent of the Parties to Create a Servitude
As noted by the court in Stegall v. HousingAuthority of City of
Charlotte:57 "Whether restrictions imposed upon land by a grantor
create a personal obligation or impose a servitude upon the land
enforceable by [or against] subsequent purchasers.., is determined by
the intention of the parties at the time the deed containing the restriction
was delivered.""8 This requirement for the running of a conservation
restriction dictates that the parties to the original agreement intend the
benefit and burden created by the agreement will pass to their
successors in interest.59 It applies equally to easements, real covenants,
and equitable servitudes.6" However, despite its importance, no formal
or precise language appears to be required within the agreement to
manifest this intent.6'
" Stegall v. Housing Authority of Charlotte, 178 S.E.2d 824 (N.C. 1971).
sId. at 828.
See French, supra note 2, at 1285.
6oSupra note 3, § 6.05[3][a][ii], at 6-109.
"id. (citing Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 12, § 2.2 (Intent to create a servitude
may be express or implied and "no particular verbal formula is required.")). This rationale was
expressed by the court in Lex Pro Corp. v. Synder Enters., Inc., 671 P.2d 637, 639 (N.M. 1983)
wherein the court stated that "[i]n addressing the requirement that the original parties intend the
covenant to run, we note that the use of technical terms in the creation of a covenant is not
necessary in order for the covenant to run." But see French, supra note 2, at 1285. "Particular
1997-98]
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Intent for the burden to run with the land may be inferred from
the circumstances surrounding execution of the servitude agreement. 2
In Lex Pro Corporation v. Synder Enterprises, landowners adjoining
the defendant's property sought enforcement of a building setback
restriction created by predecessors in interest to both parties. There
was no express statement in the deed evidencing an intent on the part
of the original parties that the restriction was to run with the land and
bind successors in interest. In upholding the restriction, the Lex Pro
court cited the court in HJ. Griffith Realty Co., v. Hobbs House, that
"effect is to be given the intention of the parties as shown by the
language of the whole instrument... considered with the circumstances
surrounding the transaction and the object of the parties in making the
restrictions. 6 3  Intent may be inferred from the nature of the
agreement,' the nature of the restriction or the consideration paid,65 or
the duration of the servitude. 66 The inherent characteristics of a
conservation servitude, where a land trust pays valuable consideration
for a long-term or permanent restriction on the use of the property, seem
to imply that the requisite intent is present.
Nonetheless, there are no safe assumptions in servitudes law.
Despite the multiple factors taken into consideration for intent, a land
methods of manifesting intent that successors be bound or benefited are traditionally required in
the law of covenants and equitable servitudes, but not in the law of easements."
62 Tenative Draft No. 1, supra note 12, § 2.2. Indeed, "the simple designation of the
transaction as an 'easement' or 'servitude' is an indication that the parties intended that the burden
run with the land." Id at § 6.02[6][d][i], 6-5 1.
3 Lex Pro Corp., 671 P.2d at 639. In making its determination, the court noted that the
plaintiff retained property next to the burdened land and therefore still derived benefit from the
agreement. Id. (citing H.J. Griffith Realty Co. v. Hobbs House Inc., 357 P.2d 677, 679 (N.M.
1960)).
64 See Lex Pro Corp., 671 P.2d at 639. ("Some promises are so intimately connected
with the land as to require the conclusion that the necessary intention for the running [of the
interest] is present absent language clearly negating that intent.") (quoting Albright v. Fish, 394
A.2d 1117, 1120 (Vt. 1978)).
" See Paine v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 736 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Ky. App. 1987)
(intent that restriction be tied to land of parties inferred from fact that restriction formed part of
the consideration for the agreement) overruled by Oliver v. Schultz, 885 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1994).
' The Lex Pro Corp. court stated:
A factor strongly favoring the inference that the burden was intended to run
is 'the permanent nature of the situation to be produced by the performance
of the covenant.' The more permanent the situation intended to be
produced the more likely that successors of the promisor were intended to
be bound by his promise since the control of the land by the promisor
himself may be but temporary.
Lex Pro Corp., 671 P.2d at 640 (citing R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY para. 673 [2]
(1981).
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trust should never discount its importance for the validation of
conservation servitudes. This caution was reflected in Stegall, where
the court noted that restrictions in a servitude agreement "will be
regarded as for the personal benefit of the grantor unless a contrary
intention appears," with the burden being upon the party asserting the
restriction to show that the agreement was intended to run with the
land.67
Further, despite a few cases to the contrary,68 the majority
position holds that regardless of the intention of the parties, a servitude
is not binding upon subsequent purchasers of the burdened estate unless
certain established legal requisites are satisfied.69 Although most courts
regard intent as only one element to be considered in determining
whether a conservation servitude runs with the land, it has been equally
understood that, notwithstanding the common law's traditional strict
approach to servitudes law, servitudes will be enforced according to the
expressed intention of the parties when all other requirements are met.70
7 Stegall v. Housing Authority of Charlotte, 178 S.E.2d 824, 828 (N.C. 1971)(citing
26 C.J.S. Deeds § 167(3) (1956)).
" See Sun Oil Co. v. Trent Auto Wash, Inc., 150 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Mich. 1967) ("The
sole test for the running of the burden in equity, is the intention of the parties to impose a servitude
upon the land as distinguished from a personal promise of the present owner.") (quoting Thodus
v. Shirk, 79 N.W.2d 733 (Iowa 1956)). It is important to note that the exclusive requirement of
intent has only been contemplated where the interest was found to be an easement or equitable
servitude.
6, Eagle Enter., Inc. v. Gross, 349 N.E.2d 816, 818-19 (N.Y. 1976). The court noted
that:
Even though the parties to the original deed expressly state in the
instrument that the covenant will run with the land, such a recital is
insufficient to render the covenant enforceable against subsequent grantees
if the other requirements for the running of [a covenant] are not met. The
rule is settled that regardless of the intention of the parties, a covenant will
run with the land and will be enforceable against a subsequent purchaser of
the land at the suit of one who claims the benefit of the covenant, only if the
covenant complies with certain legal requirements.
Id (quoting Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Ind. Sar. Bank, 15 N.E. 2d 793, 794-95
(N.Y. 1938)). Of course, intent is a fundamental element within the other rules applied to running
servitudes; most notably the touch and concern doctrine. See Section II[F], infra.
T' See Benton v. Bush, 644 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982); Allred v. City of
Huntington, 331 S.E.2d 861, 862 (W.Va. 1985) ("Although, with respect to the interpretation of
restrictive covenants .... the unrestricted use of property by the owner being favored in law, such
covenants are strictly construed, ultimately.., it is the intent of the parties that is controlling..
. .")(quoting Ballard v. Kitchen, 36 S.E. 2d 390, 393 (W. Va. 1995) and citing Wallace v. St.
Claire, 127 S.E. 2d 745 (1962)). Indeed, one commentator notes that when courts "have ignored
completely the parties' intent [they] often have reached results that are totally at odds with the
creating instrument." Alan David Hegi, The Easement in Gross Revisited: Transferability and
Divisibility Since 1945,39 VAND. L. REV. 109, 121-22 n.86 (1986).
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1. The Restatement (Third) of Property
The tentative draft ofthe Restatement specifically identifies the
intent of the parties as central to the interpretation and implementation
of servitudes.7t Section 4.1(1) states that the intention of the parties,
"ascertained from the language used interpreted in light of all the
circumstances, determines the scope [and] terms" of an expressly
created servitude. Comment (a) explains that Section 4.1 "places the
intentions and reasonable expectations of the parties at the forefront.
... To the extent they can be ascertained, they should be given effect
unless the servitude is invalid under the principles set forth in Chapter
[Three] ... ,,72
The proposed Restatement reflects what already is understood
in the common law concerning intent of the parties, although it
completely reforms the formal and technical requirements for the
validity of servitudes.73 Consequently, not only does intent retain its
initial importance in the analysis of servitudes running with the land, it
also becomes one of the central operating principles in the proposed
Restatement, under which the validity of a servitude may be explained.
B. The Affirmative / Negative Distinction
One classification of servitudes is based upon the nature of the
agreement. Essentially, an "affirmative" servitude grants the servitude
holder a right to undertake a specified activity on the servient estate.74
In contrast, a "negative" servitude limits the activities or uses a
landowner may undertake on its property. A conservation servitude is
typically a negative interest because it prevents a landowner "from
using his land in any way that would alter the existing natural or
ecological condition of the land.""5  It has been observed that
conservation servitudes carry affirmative rights as well, such as the
" See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1992), §§ 4.1,4.2
[hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 9].
7 Id. at 2, cmt. a.
" See Sections H[E][5], [F][4], and [G][2], infra.
14 See Itzchak E. Komfeld, Conserving Natural Resources and Open Spaces: A Primer
on Individual Giving Options, 23 ENVTL. L. 185, 196 (1993). An example of an "affirmative"
servitude is a right of way, such as a driveway.
" d. at 196. Thus, conservation servitudes restrict theconduct of the landowner, rather
than permit activity by the land trust. See Jordan, supra note 7, at 406-07 n.26.
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right to enter the land for inspection.16 These limited affirmative rights,
however, have not altered the general understanding of conservation
servitudes as negative use restrictions on land.
1. The Consequences of this Distinction
The common law has been generally far less receptive to the
running of negative servitudes than it has to the running of affirmative
interests." Easements have traditionally promoted affirmative interests,
while restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes have typically been
negative in nature. However, the common law recognizes three types
of negative easements: (1) For light and air; (2) for support of
buildings; and (3) for the flow of artificial streams.78 It is from these
types of interests that classification and distinction arose between
affirmative and negative servitudes.79
An open space or preservation servitude would fit within the
first category of negative easements, for light and air. Yet courts have
been reluctant to enforce other types of negative easements that, unlike
traditional ones, do not clearly benefit a dominant estate.80 This
distinction separates conservation servitudes from traditional negative
easements. A conservation servitude, in most instances, does not
benefit a discernable estate or land. Rather, its benefits extend to
neighboring landowners, and the entire community as well. Whether
a conservation servitude fits into the classification of a negative
easement may boil down to a question of terminology.
C. The Appurtenant / In Gross Distinction
As the affirmative-negative distinction focuses on what the
burden requires of the landowner, the appurtenant - in gross distinction
focuses on the benefit derived from the servitude agreement -- who or
' See Baldwin, supra note 14, at 104 n.138. This argument has been taken one step
further by Janet Diehl and Thomas S. Barrett, wherein they suggest an alternative viewpoint to the
conservation servitude as a negative restriction: "[qit may be useful, conceptually, to remember
that in the usual case . . . the restrictions in [a conservation servitude] are in support of an
overarching affirmative purpose to see to the preservation of the conservation values of the
restricted property itself." JANET DTEHL AND THOMAS S. BARRETT, THE CONVERSATION EASEMENT
HANDBOOK 172 (1988).
77 See, e.g., Netherton, supra note 41, at 561.
' See also Jordan, supra note 7, at 407 n.31 (citing Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at
13); Netherton, supra note 41, at 544.
Netherton, supra note 41, at 544.
'0 Jordan, supra note 7, at 407. See discussion on appurtenance, Section II[C], infra.
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what benefits from the restriction.
Generally, an in gross servitude benefits its holder "individually
and apart from his capacity as a landowner."'" An appurtenant
servitude, on the other hand, benefits an identifiable parcel of land
(known as the "dominant estate") usually adjoining the burdened
property owned by the grantor. However, it is not always necessary
that the dominant estate be located adjacent to the burdened estate.8
The benefited land may be within a neighborhood or, in fact, may be the
neighborhood itself. This is the case with restrictions imposed by
homeowners' associations or subdivision plats, where it is found
typically by courts that each and every lot owner within a development
may be deemed a benefited estate with standing to enforce the
restrictions."3  As noted by one commentator: "The notion of
appurtenance, a term usually employed for easements, is basically the
same as the touch or concern test for covenants and servitudes.""
1. Conservation Servitudes
Conservation servitudes, in a majority of factual contexts,
would most likely be deemed an in gross interest because they normally
do not benefit any other specific estate or land." There are instances
where an open view or preservation servitude may be appurtenant as a
scenic highway where the "dominant estate" is the highway itself.8
Further, a land trust may acquire what is known as an "anchor parcel,"
which is a fee interest in a small parcel of property extracted from the
"i Chase, supra note 3, § 6.02 [4], at 6-15 (citing the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 454
(1944)(a [servitude] is in gross when 'it is not created to benefit or when it does not benefit the
possessor of the land in his use of the land.")) See also I A.L.R.P. supra note 3, at § 6.05[3][c],
6-111 ("The benefit of the servitude may be in gross either because the beneficiary owns no land,
or because he does not enjoy the benefit in his capacity as a landowner.").
I Thomas E. Roberts, Promises Respecting Land Use - Can Benefits Be Held in
Gross?, 51 MO. L. REV. 933, 943 n.28 (1986). See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537, cmt.
h, illus. 5 (1944).
' See Benton v. Bush, 644 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982)(Restrictions to protect
beauty of neighborhood, value of property, and uniformity are covenants running with the land
binding those who purchase lots within subdivision, and are enforceable by owner of any of lots
so protected by restrictive covenants); Allred v. City of Hunington, 331 S.E.2d 861 (W.Va. 1985).
Roberts, supra note 82, at 937 n. 10.
See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 7, at 407. See also Hamilton, supra note 24, at 502
("[The conservation servitude] is categorized as negative and in gross, i.e., it restricts the actions
of the fee holder and the benefit of this burden does not run to any property, or dominant estate,
owned by the holder....").
"Roberts, supra note 82, at 962. However, other serious questions may arise in such
a finding; such as where the highway is merely an easement itself: can a less than fee interest
qualify as an appurtenant parcel of land?
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servient estate to meet the favorable treatment given appurtenant
interests.8 7
2. Consequences of the Distinction
Traditionally, where servitude interests are in gross, common
law and equity rules have "discouraged their assignability and
enforceability among successive generations of holders." 8  As a
consequence, where the servitude is in gross a majority of courts will
prohibit both legal and equitable enforcement against successive parties
to the agreement.
89
Clearly, the successful running of the restriction is essential to
the intent of the land trust, as it is a primary consideration for entering
into the agreement. The common law's hostility to in gross interests has
led to the adoption of statutes by states that ensure the successful use of
conservation servitudes by land trust organizations.'
D. Which Shoe Fits? Easements, Restrictive Covenants, and
Equitable Servitudes
One of the fundamental obstacles to enforcement and validity
of conservation servitudes at the common law level is the "confusion
over the appropriate label for these conservation interests and over the
nature of the property rights conferred."'" American jurisprudence has
recognized three categories of servitudes for achieving preservation
objectives: easements, restrictive covenants, and equitable servitudes.92
Although these different forms of servitudes may be used to serve a
wide variety of purposes,93 all three, less-than fee interests, achieve the
87 This method will be more fully discussed in Section ll[E][4], infra.
88 Netherton, supra note 41, at 541. However, as has been noted by many
commentators, "there is authority for the view that the promisee may [where the servitude is in
gross] enforce compliance with the restriction." 3 H. Tiffany, TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY § 864, at
495 (Basil Jones ed. 1939) [hereinafter TIFFANY]. Indeed, the original Restatement of Property
took the position that a restriction "will not run where there is no corresponding benefit to other
land...." Netherton, supra note 41, at 550 (citing the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 534, 537
(1944)).
89 Komgold, supra note 8, at 470-71.
"'Hamilton, supra note 24, at 485-86. These legislative declarations are discussed in
Section III, infra.
" Komgold, supra note 8, at 436.
'5 Chase, supra note 3, §6.01[1], at 6-4. See also Netherton, supra note 41, at 543.
'3 See French, supra note 2, at 1262 ("Easement, covenants, and equitable servitudes
are used today to effectuate private land use arrangements .... ") Id. at 1263. ("These private
arrangements are used extensively to secure a wide variety of economic, aesthetic, and personal
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same general purpose: "[T]hey create rights, obligations and restrictions
affecting ownership, occupancy and use of land."'94 Each has its own
requirements for creation and validity.95 These requirements become
critical with respect to the question of whether the burden of the
conservation restriction runs with the land. The distinctions can have
a fundamental impact on the enforceability and validity of conservation
servitudes in the absence of a statutory provision.
1. Easements
An easement "entitles the owner of [the] interest to a limited
use or enjoyment of the land in which the interest exists."'  There are
two fundamental characteristics of an easement that help define and
distinguish it from covenants or equitable servitudes. First, unlike a
real covenant, the easement is consistently viewed as an individual
property right, as opposed to a promise respecting the use of land.97 On
this basis, easements generally have found more favorable treatment in
the common law than covenants or equitable servitudes and have
proven to be more versatile.9" Second, with the noted exception of
those types of negative easements traditionally allowed, easements have
typically promoted affirmative interests. Conservation servitudes are
"fundamentally different [from traditional easements] in that they
[disallow] conduct by the landowner, rather than [permit] an activity by
the holder of the easement." 99
Under the common law, the burden of an easement will run
with the land and bind subsequent owners where two conditions are
met: There must be an intention on the part of the creating parties that
subsequent owners would be bound by the easement, and the
advantages to the owners and occupiers of land.") Id. at 1262.
91Id. at 1264.
" Id. In addition, "[c]ommon law covenants specifying permissible and impermissible
uses of land may be one of two types -those that are enforceable at law, and those that are
enforceable in equity." Netherton, supra note 41, at 550.
' Judith S. H. Atherton, An Assessment of Conservation Easements: One Method of
Protecting Utah's Landscape, 6 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 55, 57 (1985). See also French, supra note
2, at 1266.
97 See, e.g., Blackie, supra note 49, at 1194. There is conflict between the jurisdictions
as to the precise nature of the interest created by a restrictive covenant. Compare Meagher v.
Appalachian Electric Power Co., 77 S.E.2d 461 (Va. 1953) (where the court held that a restrictive
covenant which prohibited non-residential development constituted a property right) with Ryan
v. Town of Manalapan, 414 So.2d 193 (Fla- 1982).
"Atherton, supra note 96, at 58.
Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 12-13.
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subsequent owners must have had notice of the easement.' 0 Where the
benefit of the easement is in gross, courts have not always allowed the
burden to run with the land.'' In arguing for the expansion of
recognized negative easements to include conservation servitudes,
Jeffrey Blackie cites a Michigan Supreme Court case in which the court
expanded the classification of negative easements to include building
restrictions, stating that "the category of easements must expand with
the circumstances of mankind."'0 2 Blackie uses this holding to argue
that deterioration of the environment mandates the expansion of
easement classification to include conservation servitudes.' 3 Indeed,
Blackie notes that "[tihe category of easements has been expanded
when courts deem it necessary to give certain interests greater
protection recognizing that the rationale for limiting the category of
easements no longer applies."'" Although this argument has merit, it
overlooks an essential characteristic of traditional negative easements --
the benefit, however intangible, attaches to a specific neighboring
parcel. Unlike an easement for light or support, a conservation
servitude is typically not created by one landowner for the benefit of
1o0 Chase, supra note 3, § 6.02[6][d], at 6-50.
'o' According to Chase:
At common law, the burden of an easement could not run to successors if
the benefit of the easement was held in gross; in effect, a purported
easement in favor of a grantee who owned no land benefited by the
easement was treated as a license, so that a transfer of the owner's land
operated as a revocation.
Chase, supra note 3, § 6.02[6][e], at 6-55 to 6-56. But see Komgold, supra note 8, at 476 ("a
classic easement in gross usually binds future owners of the servient parcel."); Komfeld, supra
note 74, at 197 ("the burden of a conservation easement, unlike that of a real covenant or equitable
servitude, 'will run with the servient estate to the landowner's successors in interest even though
the benefit of the easement is in gross.'") (quoting Randec G. Fenner, Land Trusts: An Alternative
Method of Preserving Open Spaces, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1040 (1980)).
10 Johnstone v. Detroit G. H. & M. Ry. Co., 222 N.W. 325, 330 (Mich. 1928). In
addition, Dana & Ramsey have noted that: "Modem courts have shown some willingness to
recognize additional negative easements -most common are 'view easements' and 'solar easements.'
However, in making these extensions, courts emphasize analogies to the traditional subjects of
negative easements." Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 13 (citing in example Petersen v. Friedman,
328 P.2d 264 (Cal. App. 1958)).
"o See Blackie, supra note 49, at 1199. In contrast, see Dana & Ramsey, supra note
9, at 13, wherein the authors state that conservation servitudes more closely resemble restrictive
covenants, and would not fit within those traditional negative easement classifications. See also
Blackie, supra note 49, at 1198 ("Unlike a conservation [servitude] ... the benefit of each of the
traditional negative easements is held by a neighboring landowner."); French, supra note 2, at 1272
n.56 ("Since such uses clearly touch and concern the land, courts have had no occasion to consider




J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
another's property. This difference presents a salient obstacle to
equating most conservation servitudes with a negative easement.
2. Real Covenants
Real covenants are akin to easements in that they are
agreements between a landowner and another party in which "the
landowner promises to do or refrain from doing something relative to
his or her property."'05 The restriction resulting from the covenant, as
compared to an easement, has been viewed as a promise "that may be
enforced at law by successors to the original contracting parties because
the promise is 'so connected with realty that either the right to enforce
or the duty to perform passes to assigns of the land." ''   As the court
noted in Eagle Enterprises, Inc. v. Gross,'°7 a covenant is not binding
upon subsequent grantees unless certain "well-defined" legal
requirements are met.' Though it is questionable whether these
requisites are indeed well-defined, they definitely are established in the
law of real property. 109
Before a covenant may run with the land and bind a promisor's
successors, four primary requirements must be met: (1) the agreement
must be in writing; (2) the original parties to the agreement must have
intended that the covenant run with the land; (3) there must be "privity
of estate;""' and (4) the covenant must "touch and concern" the land
with which it is intended to run."' In essence the question of
Atherton, supra note 96, at 59. The author notes that "[a] negative covenant is
virtually indistinguishable from a negative easement." Id.
"' French, supra note 2, at 1269 n.41 (citing C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AN D OTHER
INTERESTS WHICH"RuN WITH THE LAND" (2d Ed. 1947)). There isjurisdictional conflictoverthe
issue of whether real covenants are property rights or mere promises affecting the use of land. See
note 97, supra.
107 Eagle Enter. v. Gross, 349 N.E.2d 816 (N.Y. 1976).
"15 Id. at 818. See also Baldwin, supra note 14, at 113 (Enforcement of the covenant
is nullified if the requirements to bind the grantor or subsequent purchasers are not satisfied).
'9 Eagle Enters., 349 N.E.2d at 818. Atherton, supra note 96, at 59 ("Because a
covenant is an express agreement more like a contract than an interest in real property, its
provisions are not automatically transferred to successive owners of the burdened and benefitted
properties. Under certain circumstances, however, covenants may'run with the land;' their burdens
6r benefits or both may pass to the subsequent owners.").
"' "Privity of estate," though a fundamental requirement for the running of a covenant,
will not be addressed in this analysis.
. These rules derive from the infamous Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583).
See also Eagle Enters. 349 N.E.2d at 818; Orange and Rockland Utils., Inc. v. Philwood Estates,
Inc., 418 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. 1981). Some courts divide the touch and concern requirement into
two separate requirements: See Johnson v. Oregon Dept. of Transp., 556 P.2d 724, 725 (Or. Ct.
App. 1976) ("Before a covenant may be said to run with the land and be binding upon a promisor's
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enforceability is to be determined "by the intent of the original parties
to the promise and by the nature and effect of the promise on their
respective estates."' 2 Covenants have often been used to control land
development and preserve open space."' However, the imposition of
the rules required for a covenant's validity may severally limit or even
prevent one from seeking enforcement of a conservation servitude.
For the holder of a conservation servitude, the most troubling
of the covenant requirements is the "touch and concern" rule, which
will be discussed more in Section II[F], infrt. Well established in
property law, the "touch and concern" requirement has also been
interpreted to mean that the burden may run only where the servitude
arrangement "benefits the promisee in the physical use or enjoyment of
the land possessed by him...," which may preclude a conservation
servitude from running where the benefit is in gross." 5 As noted by
Andrew Dana and Michael Ramsey, where a court defines a
conservation servitude as a real covenant that does not run with the
land, "a land trust would lose its conservation interest when the
[servitude] donor dies or sells the property."
'" 6
successors in interest, four requirements must be met... (3) the covenant must touch and concern
the land of the promisor, and (4) the promisee must benefit in the use of some land possessed by
him as a result of the performance of the promise.' (emphasis added)).
" Fox, supra note 45, at 4.
13 See, e.g., Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 15.
"' Chase, supra note 3, § 6.04[2][c], at 6-99. See also French, supra note 2, at 1314
n.247 ("Real covenants may be subject to a requirement that the benefit touch and concern some
land of the promisor for the burden to run, but that requirement has never been held to include any
relative location of the parcels."); Garland v. Rosenshein, 649 N.E.2d 756 (Mass. 1995);
Netherton, supra note 41, at 552 ("As a practical matter, [the touch and concern] requirement
presents a fundamental obstacle to enforcement of servitudes in gross.").
"' Land trusts typically do not own property that is specifically "benefitted" by the
servitude restriction. Note that where the interest is labeled an "easement," the question is termed
as whether the interest is appurtenant or in gross. Where the interest is labeled a real covenant or
(as will be seen) an equitable servitude, the question is whether the interest touches and concerns
the land. As Dana and Ramsey recognized: 'Note the similarity between the 'touch and concern'
rule associated with covenants and the distinction between easements appurtenant and easements
in gross. For a burden to run with the land, both easement and covenant law require that
beneficiaries of land-use restrictions own property adjacent to the burdened land." Dana and
Ramsey, supra note 9, at 16 n.67. However, this similarity should not be taken to mean that they
are in fact the same thing. As noted by French: "Appurtenance seems to require only that the
benefit be restricted to the occupants of particular parcels of land. In other words, it identifies the
possible holders of the easement right. Touch and concern, however, sometimes goes beyond this
requirement to focus on the content of the agreement." French, supra note 2, at 1272 n.55 (citing
in example, Norcross v. James, 2 N.E. 946 (Mass. 1885), overruled by 390 N.E.2d 243 (Mass.
1979), where the court held that "the benefit of a covenant not to compete did not touch and
concern the land of the promisee, even though the benefit was clearly tied to the occupancy of the
parcel of land belonging to the promisee.")
16 Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 15.
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3. Equitable Servitudes
Equitable servitudes present a more flexible enforcement
alternative to real covenants." 7 Since enforcement of covenant
restrictions are usually sought by injunction, most covenants are
litigated as equitable servitudes."'
Equitable servitudes were developed "to circumvent the
common law's traditional hostilities toward 'novel' easements and
covenants restricting the use [of land]." ' 9  The case of Tulk v.
Moxhay 12 is credited with creating the doctrine of equitable servitudes.
In Tulk, the court determined that it would be unfair to allow the
original covenantor to rid himself of a servitude burden by simply
selling the land.'2 ' In effect, the court enforced the covenant on the
basis that the succeeding landowner had purchased the property with
notice of the restriction, which nullified the requirement of "touch and
concern."' 2 It is now accepted that "[t]here are fewer requirements for
the running of the burden of an equitable servitude than for the running
of the burden of a real covenant."
2 1
This is not to imply that the "touch and concern" requirement
has been discarded for equitable servitudes, though a minority of courts
have interpreted it this way.'24 Perhaps a more accurate interpretation
is that "the meaning of the remaining requirements [for equitable
' Where "the strict requirements for a promise to run at law are not met, the obligation
created by the promise may be specifically enforceable by or against remote parties through a suit
in equity." Fox, supra note 45, at 3. "Despite the harsh legal rules governing enforcement of real
covenants at law, courts of equity may enforce restrictive covenants where the law will not." Dana
& Ramsey, supra note 9, at 16.
.. See, e.g., French, supra note 2, at 1269 n.41. It has been noted that the use of
equitable servitudes "to enforce restrictive obligations - obligations that restrict the promisor from
making specified uses of his land - is wide-spread." Chase, supra note 3, § 6.05[1], at 6-104.
"9 Netherton, supra note 41, at 551. As noted by the court in Davidson Bros., Inc. v.
D. Katz, Inc., 579 A.2d 288, 291 (N.J. 1990), cert. denied 115 S.Ct. 1693 (1995), equitable
servitudes arose to "mitigate and to eliminate many of the formalities and privity rules formulated
by the common-law courts."
'2' Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
'
21 See Davidson Bros., 579 A.2d at 292. The burden of the covenantor was to maintain
a park.
' Id. The court's position in Tulk concerning the touch and concem rule does not
represent the majority opinion in the United States.
3 Chase, supra note 3, § 6.05[1], at 6-105.
' "Thus, because those [negative] covenants typically do touch and concern the land,
the equity courts did not feel the necessity to state 'touch and concem' as a separate requirement.
... Whatever the explanation, the law of equitable servitudes did generally continue to diminish
or omit the 'touch and concern' requirement." Davidson Bros., 579 A.2d at 292.
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servitudes] may differ from real covenant definitions."' It is still
necessary that the original parties to the agreement intended the burden
to run with the land.126 Yet, equitable servitudes do not necessarily
retain the "privity of estate" requirement found in covenant law.'27
Most importantly, the party to be charged with the burden must have
had notice of the servitude when acquiring its estate in the burdened
land. '2 The salient question, especially for conservation servitudes, is
whether the touch and concern rule is still required for the enforcement
of an equitable servitude where the benefit is in gross. Several
commentators maintain that the touch and concern rule is still required
for an equitable servitude to run with the land and bind subsequent
owners of the burdened estate and that the touch and concern
requirement retains the same meaning as it does for a covenant at
law.1
29
There is a body of case law and other authority that suggests an
" Chase, supra note 3, § 6.05131, at 6-106. "Injunctions routinely are issued on proof
of breach of an equitable servitude without regard to the enforceability of the obligation as a real
covenant." French, supra note 2, at 1280.
126 Chase, supra note 3 at § 6.05[3][a], 6-107. See also Lex Pro Corp. v. Snyder
Enters., Inc., 671 P.2d 637, 639 (N.M. 1983), Sun Oil Co. v. Trent Auto Wash, Inc., 150 N.W.2d
818, 820 (Mich. 1967).
127 Chase, supra note 3 at §6.05[3][a][iii], 6-108 (stating that neither horizontal nor
vertical privity are required for the running of an equitable servitude burden)(citing the
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 539 (1944)(privity requirement omitted)). The author also states
that "[t]he servitude burdens any subsequent possessor of the servient estate, including successors
who hold a lesser estate than the promisor." Chase, supra note 3, at § 6.05 [3][a][iii], 6-108. (citing
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 539, cmt. i (1944)). See also Netherton, supra note 41, at 552
("privity of estate between promisor and promisee is not required to enforce a servitude in
equity."); French, supra note 2, at 1278 ("[e]quitable servitudes are treated like easements in that
the burden will be imposed on any possessor of the servient estate regardless of succession to any
interest or estate held by the original promisor"). But see 3 TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY § 858 (3rd
Ed) at 322 [hereinafter Tiffany Supplement]), wherein it states that enforceability of equitable
servitudes has been predicated on privity of estate between "the party claiming the benefit of the
restriction and the party subject to the burden."
"' Netherton, supra note 41, at 552. See also Atherton, supra note 96, at 60-61 ('A
prerequisite for enforcing an equitable servitude is providing notice of the restriction to subsequent
purchasers of the affected property. The requirement may be fulfilled by providing actual or
constructive notice. Proper recording of the agreement creating the restriction is sufficient to meet
the notice requirement."). See also McGuire v. Bell, 761 S.W.2d 904 (Ark. 1988) (purchaser is
charged with notice of restrictions contained in every recorded deed in his chain of title).
However, as noted by French, "[allthough notice was characterized as an affirmative requirement,
it was probably never anything more than the standard equitable defense. . . ." French, supra note
2, at 1276 n.81.
'29Netherton, supra note 41, at 552. See also 3 H. Tiffany, supra note 88, § 62.09, at
515 ("American courts probably apply the same touch and concern requirements to the burdens
of equitable servitudes as they do to real covenants."); Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 17
("nearly all courts require at least some form of appurtenance, even though they retreat from the
strict rules applied to covenants.").
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equitable servitude benefit holder need not own property that is
"touched and concerned" by the servitude restriction to enforce the
burden of the equitable servitude. Most notable of these is the original
Restatement of Property, which states that where the benefit is in gross,
the burden will not run at law but will run in equity. 3 ° The tentative
draft of the Restatement (Third) of Property expressly eliminates the
touch and concern requirement for the running of servitude burdens.'
Further, commentators have implied that the touch and concern
requirement for the running of a burden where the benefit is held in
gross may be superseded by notice.'32
This reliance on the equitable factor of notice has been the
primary instrumentality in courts' determinations that an equitable
servitude may bind parties even where the benefit is held in gross. In
the case of Pratte v. Balatsos,'33 an equitable servitude was held
effective as against a purchaser of a servient property with notice. In
delineating the doctrine of equitable servitudes, the court stated:
[T]he doctrine that a purchaser with notice of a
covenant with respect to the use of land takes subject
to the covenant may be explained by regarding the
covenant as creating an equitable easement. The
130 See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537, cmt. c, and § 539, cmt k. (1944). The
Restatement holds that no "requirement [of a dominant estate] attaches to the running of equitable
obligations." Id. at § 539, cmt. k. Further, the Restatement "takes the position that different touch
or concern rules apply in equity and law with respect to promises where the benefit is in gross."
Roberts, supra note 82, at 939. See also Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 17.
31 See Section Il[F][4], infra.
132 See 3 TIFFANY, supra note 88, § 858, at 472-73 ("In equity, the question whether
such a covenant runs with the land is material on the question of notice only, since, if it runs with
the land, the purchaser is bound regardless of his knowledge of it, while if it does not so run, he
is bound.. if he took the land with notice of the covenant.") (emphasis added).
13 Pratte v. Balatsos, 113 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1955). It bears note that the court's analysis
in Pratte has been subject to criticism. See Zechariah Chafee,Jr., The Music Goes Round and
Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250 (1955-56). However, Chafee's
criticism primarily rests upon the factual issue that Pratte involved the servitude validity of a
chattel, not real property: "No doubt, the burden of restrictions on the use of land has run in
hundreds of cases since Tulk v. Moxhay was decided in 1848, but what have these to do with an
obligation to operate ajuke box...?" Id. at 1254. Indeed, Chafee notes that his criticism is not
based upon the outcome of the case, nor the facial validity of equitable servitudes. Id at 1260,
1262. Instead, Chafee disapproves of the court's analysis as not being sufficiently deferential to
public policy considerations: "I wish that the [court] had explored the fascinating problem of the
validity of servitudes on chattels more fully, instead of assuming that restrictions run with personal
property as readily as with land." Id. at 1256 (noting that the court in Pratte based its equitable
servitude analysis on prior cases which involved building schemes on land platted into lots.) Id
at 1253 (citing Sun Valley Beach, Inc. v. Watts, 102 A.2d 504 (N.H. 1954) and Nashua Hospital
Ass'n v. Gage, 159 A. 137 (N.H. 1932)).
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doctrine extends to... restrictive covenants... [and]
may be specifically enforced in equity by means of an
injunction, not only between the immediate parties, but
also against subsequent purchasers with notice, even
when the covenants are not of the kind which
technically run with the land. 1
34
It has been noted that this principle, first derived from the court in Tulk,
has been recognized and followed in several cases. 3 The reasoning
behind this "notice" supersedence was explained in Welitoffv. Kohl. 3 6
The court, echoing the rationale of Tulk, stated that it would not be
equitable to allow a subsequent purchaser to enjoy "the fruits of
claiming under the former grant, part of the consideration for which was
the benefit promised by the covenant, to destroy such benefit by
violating the covenant."
37
3 Pratt, 113 A.2nd at 495. See also Sun Oil Co., v. Trent Auto Wash, Inc., 150
N.W.2d 818, 820 (Mich. 1967) ("There seems no reason why he and his grantee, taking title with
notice of the restriction, should not be equally bound. The contract was good between the original
parties, and it should, in equity at least, bind whoever takes title with notice of such covenant.")
(quoting Hodge v. Sloan, 17 N.E. 335 (N.Y. 1887); Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1144
(Ch. 1848). ("if there was a mere agreement and no covenant, this Court would enforce it against
the party purchasing with notice of it; for if an equity is attached to the property by the owner, no
one purchasing with notice of that equity can stand in a different situation from the party from
whom he purchased.").
"' Sun Oil, 150 N.W.2d at 820. See also Van Sant v. Rose, 103 N.E. 194, 197 (111.
1913) ("Numerous decisions of American and English courts will be found sustaining the
covenantee's right to insist upon the observance of the restrictions without making the right
dependent upon his owning related land or the existence of a dominant and servient estate "). See
also Netherton, supra note 41, at 553, wherein the Netherton notes that a minority ofjurisdictions
take a position that the "burden of an equitable servitude runs whether or not the benefit is in
gross, and [that] this view has enjoyed support in some legal literature."
,16 Welitoffv. Kohl, 147 A. 390 (N.J. 1929). See also Pratte, 113 A.2d at 492. (In its
determination, the court noted that "equity should not deny relief merely because the result of a
specific performance does not fall within one of the categories of property recognized by as such
the courts of common law.") Thus, courts have enforced a restriction on the use of land created
a servitude agreement, "whether or not the covenant is one which runs with the land." Sun Oil, 150
N.W.2d at 821. The court furthered stated: "We affirm the [Tulk doctrine] that if the owner of land
enters into a covenant concerning its use, subjecting it to an easement or personal servitude, and
the land is afterwards conveyed to one who has notice of the covenant, the grantee will take the
land bound by the covenant and will be compelled in equity to specifically execute it or will be
restrained from violating it... ."Id. (quoting Coomes v. Aero Theater and Shopping Ctr., 114 A.
2d 631 (Md. 1955). See also Oliver v. Hewitt, 60 S.E.2d I (Va. 1950) (A covenant not to use land
conveyed for specific purposes, regardless of whether it runs with the land, is enforceable in equity
against a person taking title through a deed reciting the covenant.).
"3 Welitoff, 147 A. at 392. See also Sun Oil 150 N.W.2d at 820 ("By reason of [the
restriction], the vendor received less for his land; and the plain and expressed intention of the
parties would be defeated if the covenant could not be enforced as well against a purchaser with
notice as against the original covenantor.")(quoting Hedge v. Sloan, 17 N.E. 335 (N.Y. 1887)).
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Nonetheless, the majority of jurisdictions still hold that the
burden of an equitable servitude does not run where the benefit is held
in gross.' The validity of a conservation restriction, if deemed an
equitable servitude, may depend primarily on the jurisdiction wherein
enforcement is sought or the validity of the restriction is challenged.
4. The Consequences of Being One Type or Another
In addition to the unique requirements for the burden to run
with the land, the designation of a conservation servitude as an
easement, real covenant, or equitable servitude may have other
substantive effects as well. A good way to demonstrate the differences
is to provide an example in a context that is central to the conservation
servitude: enforceability. Enforceability is a subject at the heart of a
conservation servitude, and doctrines other than those that touch upon
validity of the servitude equally affect its utility. Though essential for
the enforcement of equitable servitudes, notice has not been recognized
as a requirement for covenants or easements, though "both have been
subject to the requirement that they be created in writing."' 39  In
addition, there are several termination doctrines that, depending on the
interest, may eliminate the restriction created by the servitude.
Examples include the doctrines of changed conditions, relative
hardship, and abandonment. 4 ' Perhaps most relevant to the
enforcement of conservation servitudes is the changed conditions
"8 Netherton, supra note 41, at 552. See also Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 17
("nearly all courts require at least some form of appurtenance, even though they retreat from the
strict rules applied to covenants."); French, supra note 2, at 1277 ("American law requires
appurtenance of benefit.... .") (citing to Stegall v. Housing Authority of Charlotte, 178 S.E.2d
824, 829 (N.C. 1971) and Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons, Inc., 170 A.2d 52, 55, 56 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Tir. 1961). Indeed, often where an equitable servitude is upheld, even though the
benefit is technically "in gross", the beneficiary of the agreement often owns land adjacent to or
nearby the burdened estate (such as a covenant not to compete). It has been noted by French that
this "[clonvergene of the touch and concern and the appurtenance requirements is unique to
equitable servitudes." French, supra note 2, at 1278. French has also stated that although the
doctrine of Tulk has been recognized in American law, "the courts gradually limited its application
by imposing restrictions drawn from the law of easements and of covenants." Id. at 1276-77.
"' French, supra note 2, at 1277 n.8 1. French further comments that "in the United
States the notice requirement has no real significance because of the pervasive recording system
requirements which apply equally to all servitudes." Id.
" The doctrines of Changed Conditions and Relative Hardship will be discussed more
fully in Section IH[I], infra. Abandonment has been asserted in cases wherein a landowner has
attempted to invalidate a use restriction. (See Peterson v. Greenway Parks Home Owners Ass'n,
408 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)) However, absent a specific showing of an intent to




doctrine. Generally, it is thought that the changed conditions doctrine
does not apply to easements, 4 ' but does apply to covenants and
equitable servitudes. 4 ' Other equitable defenses, such as relative
hardship and laches, have been successfully applied to defeat equitable
servitudes.'
Another essential difference is the remedy available to the land
trust for breach of the conservation restriction. The typical remedy for
violation of an easement has been specific performance by way of an
injunction, whereas a breach of a covenant may be restricted to
damages.'" Enforcement of an equitable servitude typically involves
injunctive relief, although this can vary dependent on the facts of the
particular case.145  Perhaps more importantly, an equitable servitude
may entitle a land trust to injunctive relief without the burden of
proving damages.1 46 This can be of primary importance to a holder of
a conservation servitude, as "[t]he assumption of injury protects
aesthetic and psychological values that are very difficult to quantify...
1)147
All of these subtle differences underscore the importance of
understanding what interest is in fact created by a conservation
servitude, and what body of law will be found applicable by a court of
law.' Traditionally, courts have treated easements as "valuable and
protected property rights, while treating real covenants with suspicion
141 See Reichman, supra note 34, at 1180; Komgold, supra note 8, at 484; Blackie,
supra note 49, at 1194; French, supra note 2, at 1269. However, as with all provisions in
servitudes law, there is conflict: see generally Komgold, supra note 8, at 483 ("[chlose
examination of the relevant law... reveals that the changed conditions and relative hardship
doctrines actually do apply to easements.").
1' See Reichman, supra note 34, at 1180; Komgold, supra note 8, at 484; Baldwin,
supra note 14, at 120; French, supra note 2, at 1280.
"' See Reichman, supra note 34, at 1180. See also French, supra note 2, at 1280
n.105, (French notes that when courts determine whether to enforce an equitable servitude, they
take into consideration: the current hardship on the covenantor / successor versus the hardship at
the time of creation; as well as the current benefit to the covenantee / successor versus the benefit
at the time of creation.)
'" See, e.g., Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 33. See also Atherton, supra note 96,
at 59 ("Real covenants are normally only enforceable through suits for monetary damages.").
"I Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 33. Indeed, the final relief obtained in Pratte,
where the court enforced an equitable servitude, was monetary damages. (See Pratte v. Balatsos,
113 A. 2d 492 (N.H. 1955)).
',' French, supra note 2, at 1301.
7 ld. at 1302. In addition, this assumption removes the requirement on the plaintiff
to show that "violation of a particular restriction in fact lessens the value of [his or her] land." Id.
"' See Korngold, supra note 8, at 436. As Komgold observed, the issue is ultimately
what law applies, not what label gets attached to the conservation interest. Perhaps the casual use
of the term conservation "easement" reflects this thought.
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and subjecting them to greater barriers against enforcement."' 49 An
additional difficulty is the blurring of covenants and equitable
servitudes by the courts, 5 ' while at the same time there has been an
evolving barrier between easements and covenants.' Added to (or
resolving) this confusion is the tentative draft of the Restatement
(Third) of Property, which eliminates all distinction between the
requirements for the creation of servitudes that are enforceable in law
or equity."'
However, as noted by Uriel Reichman, "very little substance
lies behind these phrases and using such definitions to distinguish
between the forms is virtually impossible."'53  Further, there is
contradictory authority for virtually any proposition in the law of
servitudes.'54 Despite this uncertainty, there are identifiable approaches
in the law concerning the nature of servitudes that at least help imply
how a court may handle a conservation restriction.
5. Identification of the Interest
a. The Commentators: ProbablyNot an Easement
It has been suggested that where the holder of a servitude seeks
recovery in the form of damages, the law of covenants should apply. By
contrast, for one who seeks an injunction, the laws of equitable
servitudes should govern.' Other commentators have suggested that
whether a servitude is an easement or covenant depends on the nature
of the grant in the servitude agreement.'56 Nonetheless, with a few
149 Id.
"s Reichman, supra note 34, at 1186. In addition, negative easements, like covenants
and equitable servitudes, have also been used to restrict land use, and thus further blur the
distinction. See French, supra note 2, at 1277 n.77. See also Chase, supra note 3, § 6.05(3][c],
at 6-112 ("A restrictive obligation [could] be enforced as a negative easement.").
"I Blackie, supra note 49, at 1198. In example, the limitation of allowable negative
easements by courts; primarily restricting the development of easement law to affirmative
obligations.
" Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 3.2, at 26.
"3 Reichman, supra note 34, at 1181. Reichman further notes that these ... fictional
distinctions reduce predictability, encourage litigation, and unduly complicate the drafting of
private planning documents." Id. at 1182.
"IJd. at 1180.
155 Chase, supra note 3, § 6.05[1], at 6-104.
"6 See Blackie, supra note 49, at 1222 n.67. See also Roberts, supra note 82, at 962
("If language of grant is used rather than language of promise, it is more likely to be labeled an
easement and thus, the public body escapes the fatal covenant in gross label."); Blackie, supra note
49, at 1197 ("the term 'interest in property' by itself does not assure that any extra protection given
to easements would carry over to conservation [servitudes].").
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exceptions,157 most commentators believe that conservation servitudes
are more closely related to real covenants than easements.' The
justification for this determination lies in the characteristics of
traditional easements as compared with the type of interest conveyed in
a conservation servitude. As noted by Komgold, traditional easements
usually do not provide veto power over another's land but instead
involve "clearly defined, limited interests, affecting only a portion of
the servient land."'5 In addition, conservation easements are typically
viewed as not resembling any of the traditional negative easements. 60
Yet many of the characteristics that may exclude conservation
servitudes from being considered an easement would also preclude
them from being considered covenants as well.16 ' Covenant law may
be inapplicable where, as would an owner of a conservation servitude,
the holder of the covenant benefit seeks an injunction.
Because conservation servitudes imprecisely fit within each of
these common law interests, it has been suggested that courts have
substantial discretion in choice of remedy where there is no statutory
guidance.'62 Further, the proliferation of conservation servitude
legislation diminishes the importance of these common law distinctions.
Indeed, as noted by Judith Atherton, none of the common law interests
are "flexible enough to incorporate everything needed to create an
effective conservation restriction."''
b. The Cases: Probably an Easement
The issue has rarely been directly addressed by the courts.
Those that have discussed the nature of conservation servitudes have
generally treated them as easements.' In Village of Ridgewood v.
Bolger Foundation,65 the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a real
estate tax reduction for the grant of an in gross servitude to a nonprofit
"' See Baldwin, supra note 14, at 104 ("A conservation [servitude] is typically
classified as an in gross, negative easements."). See also Blackie, supra note 49, at 1199.




" oSee, e.g., id at 437. See also supra, Section HI[D][l].
6 Blackie, supra note 49, at 1199. ("Just as easements traditionally could not be held
in gross, neither, in the majority ofjurisdictions, could real covenants.").
362 Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 33.
163 Atherton, supra note 96, at 56-57.
1" Blackie, supra note 49, at 1200. See Harris v. Pease, 66 A.2d 590, 591 (Conn.
1949) ('The provision against the erection of buildings created a servitude upon the [property] in
the nature of an easement....').
36 Village of Ridgewood v. Bolger Found., 517 A.2d 135 (N.J. 1986).
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conservation foundation. In identifying the nature of the interest
conveyed, the court noted that: "Conservation [servitudes] of the kind
here considered are easements in gross. While there is no identifiable
dominant estate that directly enjoys the benefit thereof, obviously such
an easement can enhance the value of other property in the area."' 66
The courts analysis likened conservation servitudes to easements
involving free public access to property, thus allowing recognition for
real estate tax evaluation purposes.167
The federal courts have also identified conservation servitudes
as an in gross easement. In United States v. Albrecht,6' the court
upheld an order requiring the defendants to restore drainage ditches on
their property, which was subject to a federally-owned conservation
servitude created pursuant to the Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act. 1
69
In addressing the servitude the court stated: "Here is created a non-
appurtenant restriction on [the use of the land]. Traditionally, the
interest in land conveyed would be an easement in gross ... .,"7 The
court determined that "[tihis right to property use conveyed can be seen
traditionally as an easement in gross for the benefit of the United States
and to run indefinitely .... ,171
However, it should be noted that in both Village of Ridgewood
and Albrecht, the courts were acting pursuant to specific statutorily-
authorized interests in land, 72 and that the existence of these statutes
likely affected the courts' analysis of the conservation servitude
interests. Indeed, the court in Albrecht stated: "It appears to this Court
to be immaterial what term is used to describe the interest acquired. To
attach a label to it and then apply a rule of law applicable to that label
that would wholly defeat the purpose of the program cannot be
permitted."'7 3 With the proliferation of statutory provisions in the past
two decades, legislatures may resolve the difficult policy
" Id. at 137. The court defined the nature of the interest as an easement in gross, as
it benefited "no specific parcel owned by another; it is independent of and unconnected to the
ownership or possession of any particular tract." Id.
167 Id. at 136-37. The court made this analogy notwithstanding the fact that the
landowner retained exclusive access to the burdened property.
" United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974).
169 16 U.S.C.A. § 718d(c) (West 1996).
170 Albrecht, 496 F.2d at 909-10.
171 Id. at 910.
172 In Village of Ridgewood, the statutory provisions was the New Jersey Conservation
Restriction and Historic Preservation Act [N.J. STAT. ANN.. §§ 13:8B-1 to -9 (West 1996)]. In
Albrecht, the statutory provision was the Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act [16 U.S.C.A. § 18d(c)
(West 1996)].
"71 Albrecht, 496 F.2d at 910 (quoting United States v. Albrecht, 364 F.Supp. 1349,
1351 (D. N.D. 1973)).
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determinations that would otherwise be left to the courts. However it
is still uncertain as to whether these provisions would be upheld by a
court and the fact remains that jurisdictions exist that do not have the
benefit ofdeclared legislative policy.
E. Servitudes and the In Gross Benefit: Policy and Rationale
It should be mentioned that the discussion in the following
three sections concerning benefits in gross, touch and concern, and
contract versus alienability are essentially three different approaches to
the common question of whether any limits should be imposed on the
running of burdens.' 74 The primary hurdle to enforcement of
conservation servitudes lies in the "benefit in gross," "touch and
concern" prohibitions placed upon servitudes by the common law. The
significance of these barriers is fundamental, in that they go "to the very
heart of the main reason to acquire such an interest-certainty of land
use."'173 As noted by Neil Hamilton:
[W]hile the legal understanding and acceptance of the
concept of conservation [servitudes] has increased
greatly in recent decades, there remains a significant
common law hostility towards such less-than-fee
interests which are classified as negative restrictions in
gross. This hostility is reflected in a diversity of legal
precedents among the states on issues such as
transferability and enforceability of such interests.'76
Indeed, the basis for this restrictive stance is deeply imbedded within
the law of property, and constitutes the majority position implemented
"7 Thomas, supra note 29, § 62.08, at 511.
17S Hamilton, supra note 24, at 503.
ld at 502.
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by the courts.'77 This has been true for easements, 7 ' covenants,'79 and
equitable servitudes.'"0 A "minority" position allows certain in gross
servitudes to run with the land,'' and many commentators, and certain
authorities urge abolition of the restriction.8 2
See Roberts, supra note 82, at 937 ("If the benefit of the promise does not.., relate
to land, then the benefit is regarded as personal, or in gross, and the successor to the promisor will
not be bound."); Netherton, supra note 41, at 550 (when servitudes ire "held in gross, problems
arise regarding [their] assignability and running.") See also Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons
Inc., 170 A.2d 52, 56 (N.J. App. 1961) ("When... the burden is placed upon the land, and the
benefit is personal to one of the parties and does not extend to his or other lands, the burden is
generally held not to run with the land at law."); Atherton, supra note 96, at 57-58 ("Courts today
are reluctant to enforce [servitudes in gross] against subsequent servient property owners or to
allow the holders of [the servitude] in gross to transfer the interest to other parties.").
7 See Welitoffv. Kohl, 147 A. 390, 393 (N.J. 1929) ("Even in the case of a formally
granted legal easement, the existence of the dominant estate is ordinarily essential to the validity
of the servitude granted, and the destruction of the dominant estate releases the servitude.")
However, there is also persuasive commentary to the opposite effect. See discussion, infra on the
various policy and legal arguments advancing the minority position.
1
7 See 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §9.13, at 375 (A.Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter
A.L.P.] ("where the burden relates to the use of the covenantor's land, there must be a
corresponding benefit to some land of the covenantee.") (citing the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 537(a) (1944)). See also Garland v. Rosenshein 649 N.E.2d 756,758 (Mass. 1995) ("Cases have
stated that where the benefit is personal, the burden of the covenant does not run with the land.").
11 See 2 A.L.P, supra note 177, § 9,32, at 429-30 ("courts in the majority of the
American cases [deny] enforcement of equitable servitudes in which the benefit is in gross."). See
also Netherton, supra note 41, at 533 ("The majority of states take a position that the burden of
an equitable servitude will not run when the benefit is in gross."); Caullett, 170 A.2d at 56. The
enforcement of an equitable servitude in gross can raise serious questions. As observed in 2
A.L.P., supra note 177, § 9.32, at 428-429 ("If equity is considered to be merely granting specific
performance of a contract, then the only materiality of the existence of any benefited land is on the
question ofdamages. But if equity is considered to be enforcing an equitable incorporeal property
interest against the burdened land, then the problem narrows down to the question of the extent
to which thejurisdiction involved recognizes legal easements in gross, and the additional question
as to whether equity in developing its concept of an equitable servitude should be limited by the
rules laid down by courts of law in reference to legal easements."). This last question illustrates
the confusion over the proper scope and flexibility of equitable servitudes, discussed supra.
"' See Chase, supra note 3, § 6.05[3][c], at 6-111 ("American courts have clearly
rejected the rule against the running of the burden when the benefit is in gross in the case of
easements, and a majority apparently also reject the rule in the case of real covenants."). See also
2 A.L.P., supra note 177, § 9.32, at 430 ("practically all of the American courts have now
recognized the validity of legal easements in gross against subsequent owners of the servient land
... ."); Netherton, supra note 4 l, at 551; Lex Pro Corp. v. Snyder Enter., Inc., 671 P.2d 637, 639
(N.M. 1983) ("It is possible for the.., benefit of the covenant to be merely personal to the
covenantee while the burden runs with the covenantor's interest in land.")(citing R. POwELL, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 673[2] (1981)).
"' See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 2.6 (benefits in gross frely permitted),
discussed infra. See also Chase, supra note 3, § 6.05[31[c]; 2 A.L.P., supra note 177, § 9.32.
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1. The Great Policy Debate (Part I): Benefits in Gross and
the Law of Servitudes
a. The Pro-Restriction Arguments
Several specific rationales for prohibiting the running of
servitudes arise out of the general concerns of economic productivity
and fairness. These can be divided into three basic categories, based
upon the policy they seek to promote: (i) notice and identification, (ii)
economic and social balance, and (iii) democratic values.
i. Notice and Identification
One of the original purposes served by the appurtenance
requirement was that the servitude holder could be more readily
identified.183 This is desirable for two reasons. First, an identifiable
and local servitude holder helps to reduce costs for one seeking to
purchase the burdened estate, in that the purchaser would not be
required to negotiate for modification or release of the servitude with
a distant individual or entity."8 Even with the presence of a modern
recording system, an identifiable servitude holder is no easier to
communicate with if they are not situated within the same locale. In
addition, a more distant party may be less affected by the economic or
social necessities (and influence) of a community, and less willing to
negotiate for the release of the servitude.'85
The second advantage of the appurtenance requirement is seen
as a notice-providing device, in that it serves to protect purchasers of
the servient estate." 6 Underlying this belief is the assumption that an
appurtenant interest is more readily identifiable, as all that is required
for discovery is a neighborhood inquiry.8 7 However, because of the
modem recording system, this rationale no longer adds weight to the
argument."'
... See, e.g., French, supra note 33, at 945.
See Sterk, supra note 46, at 651. See also French, supra note 2, at 1287.
O8 f course, a servitude owner who does not live in the community could be equally
disinterested about maintaining the restriction and be more willing to sell the restriction. See also
discussion, infra, Section ll[G][l].
'6 French, supra note 2, at 1286.
197Id.
" See infra, Section l[E][l][b][i].
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ii. Economic and Social Balance
The appurtenance requirement retains the social benefit of the
restriction within the same community.'89 The apparent advantage is
one of off-setting benefit: If there is a dominant estate, at least some
land may increase in value as a result of the servitude arrangement.' 0
The appurtenance requirement has been viewed by courts as preventing
personal economic gain at the expense of a restricted estate.' 9'
Relatedly, having a specified parcel benefitting from the restriction
eliminates the indefinite or intangible character cast upon benefits in
gross.
192
iii. Promoting Democratic Values
The final rationale supporting the prohibition against the
running of in gross servitudes relies on the free use of property and the
avoidance of what is known as "dead-hand" control of land. This
policy starts with the view that servitudes in gross threaten the
autonomy of the burdened landowner, and thus deserve close
scrutiny. 93 Further, it is believed that servitude restrictions adversely
affect alienability, 94 one of the most fundamental rights in property
law, distorting or freezing land use and development, and imposing
unreasonable burdens that ultimately depress land value.' 95
Inherent in these concerns is the general notion of democratic
"s Jordan, supra note 7, at 489 n.34. See Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons Inc., 170
A.2d 52, 56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Dir. 1961) ("The policy is strong against hindering the
alienability ofone property where no corresponding enhancement accrues to surrounding lands.").
1 '"Roberts, supra note 82, at 944. See also Netherton, supra note 41, at 554-55 ("There
is a social interest in the utilization of land. That social interest is adversely affected by burdens
placed on the ownership of land ... [u]nless a burden has some compensatory advantage which
prevents it from being on the whole a deterrent to land use and development .... " (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §537, cmt. a(1944)). For application of this rationale, see Johnson
v. Oregon Dept. of Transp., 556 P.2d 724, 725 (Or. Ct. App. 1976).
"' See Garland v. Rosenshein, 649 N.E.2d 756 (Mass. 1995) ("Under common-law
principles, restriction in deed prohibiting development of property with adjoining land was
unenforceable by grantor [since] grantor owned no land benefited by restriction, only benefit from
restriction was potential economic gain that defendant might receive from payment for release of
restriction, and that benefit was personal.").
'92 Roberts, supra note 82, at 949.
9 See, e.g., Komgold, supra note 8, at 441.
"9 Roberts, supra note 82, at 944 (citing RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537 (1944)).
French notes that these arguments carries two major assumptions: (1) that such servitude
restrictions do in fact inhibit the alienability of the land; and (2) that benefits in gross hinder
alienability more than benefits appurtenant. French, supra note 33, at 943.
'9 French, supra note 2, at 1265.
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choice as to land use. In essence, where there is an in gross benefit, a
single individual or entity has perpetual blanket control over the use of
land. If this entity is a land trust outside of the area, it may be immune
to public need and accountability." As observed by French, the
prohibition against the running of benefits in gross "tends to assure that
the plaintiff has a legitimate interest in enforcing the covenant -- acting
in effect as a substitute for a standing requirement."'197
Allowing in gross servitude restrictions to run can preclude
democratic involvement in land use decisions that affect not only an
individual landowner, but the community as well. Though conservation
may be deemed an important value, its significance may shrink next to
the needs of the community for such necessities as hospitals or
schools.1 9 When ownership of appurtenant property is required, there
is a more limited number of parties capable of exercising discretionary
control over individual property."9 Further, an adjacent landowner is
arguably in a better position to determine when a servitude restriction
should in fact be enforced, being more sensitive to the needs of the
locale and less willing to pursue servitudes that no longer provide a
definite benefit. 00
These policy considerations provide persuasive argument for
retaining the appurtenance requirement. However, there is an equally
compelling argument for its abolition.
b. The Anti-Restriction Policies
Four basic rationales have been advanced against the
appurtenance requirement: (i) notice and fairness to the grantee; (ii) the
"no difference" argument; (iii) the rise of environmental values; and
(iv) existing law and better options.
196 Korngold, supra note 8, at 441.
"7 French, supra note 33, at 947.
1I" Korngold, supra note 8, at 441.
"9 Id. at 458. Kormgold notes this is primarily due to the "practical difficulties and
expense of acquiring adjacent land." Id.
o See id. at 469 ("when a private group enforces a conservation servitude in gross, it
makes a judgement that society is being harmed, a decision about the needs of others that the
private association is not clearly qualified to make."). See also French, supra note 2, at 1287
("Another function served by the appurtenance requirement may be that it reduces the incentives
to seek enforcement of economically undesirable and obsolete restrictions.").
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i. Notice, Recording Acts, and Overall
Fairness
The primary argument against negating servitudes in gross is
that one who takes land with notice that it is subject to a restrictive
agreement should not be permitted to escape its terms.' This policy
is further predicated on the understanding that, if an in gross servitude
could not be enforced against a subsequent owner of the burdened
estate, a promisee, who paid valuable consideration for the restriction,
could be deprived of its rights by a collusive transfer.20 2 As noted by
Thomas Roberts, "[t]he anti-in gross view, which automatically sets
aside the contract, unjustifiably substitutes a judicial judgment for the
agreement of the parties."2 3 In addition, though the appurtenance
requirement may reduce transaction costs, it has been argued with equal
force that destruction of an in gross benefit actually increases the
overall associated costs by eliminating a valid contract right."°
The development of recording statutes has eliminated a
substantial part of the rationale underlying the hostility to servitudes in
gross. As observed by Netherton:
In the twentieth century reliance on record searches
became so universal that the chances of overlooking
interests held in gross were greatly minimized ....
Current recording systems therefore provide an answer
20" 3 Tiffany, supra note 88, § 858, at 471. Inherent in this argument is that when a
subsequent purchaser acquires the burdened property with notice of the restriction, the effect of
the restriction was (or could have been) reflected in the price paid for the servient estate.
Therefore, the subsequent purchaser stands in no better position than the original grantor; and if
the restriction was enforceable against the original grantor, it should also be enforceable against
the purchaser with notice. See Chase, supra note 3, § 6.05[5], at 6-118 (a servitude is enforceable
unless unreasonable or against public policy). See also Van Sant v. Rose, 103 N.E. 194, 197 (Il1.
1913); Pratte v. Balatsos 113 A.2d 492,495 (N.H. 1955); Sun Oil Co.v. Trent Auto Wash, Inc.,
150 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Mich. 1967).2o2 See 3 Tiffany, supra note 88. at § 861,489. See also Sun Oil, 150 N.W.2d at 821.
203 Roberts, supra note 82, at 949. See also Epstein, supra note 36, at 1359 ("Insistence
that the attachment of merely personal obligations to land is likely to frustrate, rather than enhance,
the objectives which a private land holding system seeks to realize presupposes that we have some
collective vision of what that system is supposed to do.") This observation cuts against those
assumptions underlying the democratic values arguments mentioned in Section lI[E][1][a][iii].
See also 'Automatic' Sprinkler Corp. of America v. Kerr, No 11-017, 1986 WL 7307, *3 (Ohio
App. June 30, 1986) ("It is no answer to say that [violation of the restriction] will inflict no injury
on the plaintiff, or will be even beneficial to him. It is for the plaintiff to judge whether the
agreement shall be preserved as far as he is concerned, or whether he shall permit it to be
violated.")(quoting Brown v. Huber, 80 OHio ST. 183, at 207 (1909)).
04 Roberts, supra note 82, at 947.
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to a major part of the common law's concern to protect
landowners from surprise and the difficulty of finding
parties from whom releases can be obtained."'
As a purchaser is charged with notice of instruments in the record, a
subsequent purchaser cannot argue surprise or unfair imposition of the
burden of a duly recorded servitude.
ii. The "No Difference" Argument
Some argue that in gross servitudes are fundamentally no
different from appurtenant interests. As noted by Thomas Roberts: "It
is true that allowing the separation of development rights drives up
transaction costs since the buyer must deal with two sellers rather than
one, but the same thing occurs where there is a covenant
appurtenant. '' 206  Interests such as conservation servitudes do not
prevent alienation of land to any greater degree than appurtenant
restrictions. 27 Though the landowner's ability to use the land is limited
or defined, this does not inhibit his right to sell the burdened estate.20 8
The characterization of a conservation servitude as a restraint on
alienation is largely an exaggeration. The additional fact that the
benefit of a negative use restriction is owned by an adjacent landowner
makes the servitude no more easily discoverable in the absence of a
recording statute and no less alienable.20 9
There is concern that the appurtenance requirement is overly-
broad, and often eliminates servitudes that are beneficial to the
community as a whole.210 This often is true of conservation servitudes,
which may increase the aesthetic value of a locale (which in and of
itself has several indirect benefits such as quality of life), prevent
' Netherton, supra note 41, at 554, 556.
206 Roberts, supra note 82, at 946. French argues that "[t]he benefits derived from the
appurtenance requirement are not without cost. The requirement may prevent useful transactions,
or make them more expensive. .. ." French, supra note 2, at 1287.
207 See Sterk, supra note 46, at 651. Sterk further notes that "[tlhe Restatement of
Property's suggestion that a restriction affecting alienability is somehow more tolerable when there
is a countervailing benefit in the use of either the burdened land or of some other land does not
provide a reason for the distinction." Id.
: Komgold, supra note 8, at 477.
0 See French, supra note 2, at 1286 n. 137.
21I d. at 1307. French further notes that: "Although the traditional methods of
restricting interests from running afford some protection against title clogging and the high costs
of negotiation to secure modifications or releases, such protection is erratic, largely ineffective, and
comes at a very high confusion cost." Id. at 1310.
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unwanted or poorly-planned development, and provide other
conceivable values. Fears of dead-hand control may be unfounded or
overblown. In recognizing that governmental agencies and land trusts
represent the overwhelming majority of conservation servitude holders,
and that these two share many of the same essential characteristics,
Netherton notes: "Being immortal and locally fixed, such [entities] do
not die or move away as natural persons do, and so their interests
present no unusual complications to the task of documenting the
marketability ofthe burdened property." 21' Decisions likeAlbrecht may
evidence a moderation of the rules against in gross servitudes.
2  Even
though these decisions involve public agencies, the nature of charitable
organizations may allow them to claim similar rationale for
enforcement.
iii. The Rise and Recognition of
Environmental Values
During the earlier development of servitudes law, courts had a
heavy tendency to promote economic development of land. Privately
held servitudes in gross were in direct conflict with this policy. This
perspective helped courts support the prohibitions against allowing in
gross servitude restrictions to run with the land.
2 3  Despite this
inclination, support for conservation values has steadily grown over the
past decades and may have achieved equality with development and
exploitation interests. As noted by Netherton in 1979:
If the recent national debates over land use planning
legislation and the increasing refinement of national
and state environmental impact and pollution control
programs correctly reveal contemporary thinking about
land use, the present generation clearly recognizes that
some situations call for putting a higher priority on
management than on development of land.2"4
2" Netherton, supra note 41, at 558. See also Komgold, supra note 8, at 473
("Servitudes in gross yielding a public benefit should be valid if held by a governmental entity,
because the concerns about dead hand control and lack of flexibility are alleviated; the democratic
process ensures that these entities will be responsive to the changing needs of society.").212 Netherland, supra note 41, at 558.
213 Korngold, supra note 8, at 455.
214 Netherton, supra note 41, at 555.
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This substantial change in public attitude toward favoring conservation
diminishes the strength of the rationale behind the traditional hostility
toward in gross servitudes running with the land.2 '
iv. Existing Property Law
The final set of arguments advanced in favor of allowing in
gross servitudes to run with the land compare the restricted form with
similar interests that are allowed to bind subsequent purchasers. As
noted by the American Law of Property: "[S]ince [courts] recognize
the enforcement of easements in gross, there should be no policy
opposed to the enforcement of a running burden merely because the
benefit happens to be in gross. '216  Indeed, arguments have been
advanced to include conservation servitudes as within, or a natural
expansion of, those traditional negative easements allowed to run with
the land.217 Further, strict interpretation on the restriction against in
gross servitudes would result in the elimination of several useful
interests that have traditionally been allowed to run with the land."'
One commentator interestingly notes that conditions may be held in
gross, and that there is no substantial reason to distinguish between
covenants and conditions.219
A final argument against the restriction on in gross servitudes
is that the law has developed effective doctrines (such as changed
conditions) to eliminate obsolete and unreasonable servitudes, and no
longer requires a blanket prohibition out of fear that a court would not
be able to address them. This has been the approach adopted by the
proposed Restatement (Third) of Property.
2"' See Hamilton, supra note 24, at 505. Further, the restriction has been questioned
on the grounds that it does not explain why the benefit of the servitude must in fact be land
(require an adjacent dominant parcel). See Roberts, supra note 82, at 944. Hence, perhaps, for the
allowance of commercial restrictions to run where the benefit is deemed to be in gross. See infra
discussion in Section II[E][3].
2 A.L.P., supra note 177, § 9.13, at 375.
"7 Netherton notes that such servitudes represent a unique opportunity to "develop a
new dimension of real property law capable of accommodating the wide range of competing
demands upon land, water and natural resources much more fully and effectively than in the past."
Netherton, supra note 41, at 543.
.. Sterk, supra note 46, at 651. Sterk points to railroad rights-of-way and utility
easements as not being attached to appurtenant land.
219 Roberts, supra note 82, at 935. Roberts gives an example in that "fain owner may
create a defeasible fee and retain either a possibility of reverter or a right of entry which, though
there is no dominant estate, is enforceable by forfeiture, a sanction more severe than ... an
injunction which could result from enforcing a... servitude." Id at 935 n.5.
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2. Conservation Servitudes and Public Benefit
The law of servitudes has developed partially in response to
what is deemed the "public interest." In times of vast economic and
industrial growth, ensuring that land was left open for exploitation was
often the only thought of "preservation" for courts to consider. More
recently, the notion of what is "best" for the public interest has changed
significantly, particularly in regard to land conservation. This might be
best explained by comparing the concepts of "best use" and "most
profitable use" of land. With the increasing presence of environmental
legislation, including statutes that specifically provide for conservation
servitudes, the "public interest" no longer demands servitudes that only
secure "most profitable" uses of the land. As argued by Roberts:
Since the preservation of environmentally sensitive
land and historical landmarks are deemed to be within
the public interest so as to justify the exercise of a
state's regulatory power [citing to Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 43 8 U.S. 104
(1978)], there should be no objection to permitting the
public to achieve similar objectives by purchase of less
than a fee interest.22
Considered against a backdrop of direct public and legislative support
for conservation servitudes, including favorable tax relief at both the
state and federal level, there is definitive evidence that conservation
servitudes have recognized public benefit. 22' As the court observed in
Bennett v. Commissioner of Food and Agriculture:2 2 "Where the
beneficiary of the restriction is the public and the restriction reinforces
a legislatively stated public purpose, old common law rules barring the
creation and enforcement of [servitudes] in gross have no continuing
force. 222
a20 Id at 962.
2' Korngold, supra note 8, at 453 n.85. See also Village of Ridgewood v. Bolger
Found., 517 A.2d 135, 137 (N.J. 1986) ("The public benefits flowing from such a conservation
easement are beyond debate, as shown by... legislative findings and declaration .. .
222 Bennett v. Comm'r of Food and Agric., 576 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass. 1991).
Id. at 1367. The court further noted that "certain common law rules concerning the
creation, validity, and enforcement of servitudes may no longer be sound and that [the court is]
willing to reconsider them in appropriate cases." Id. at 1368 n.4. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court's decision in Garland arguably limits Bennett wherein the court states: "although we have
expressed a willingness to reconsider common law rules concerning the creation, validity, and
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Although this judicial response could be viewed as hampering
the value and alienability of land, several contrary arguments have been
advanced.224 As defined by Netherton, allowing more access to
preservation tools should not be equated with supporting a "no-growth"
policy. Rather, it creates a "new growth" policy wherein conservation
interests are on equal footing with exploitation and development
interests.2 Further, what was deemed an unacceptable land use
practice a mere fifty years ago now enjoys wide support.226 This
observation reflects two important understandings: (1) Today interests
such as conservation servitudes are not only accepted, but promoted as
beneficial to the public; and (2) traditional understanding and legal
rules that no longer conform to the goals of society are in need of
change.227 By not allowing conservation servitudes to run with the land,
courts indirectly reduce "the supply of important natural and scenic
resources and thus may harm future generations. '2 ' Allowing for the
specific enforcement of conservation servitudes reinforces fundamental
policies found in the law: Including the preservation of the original
parties' expectations, and providing for relative certainty in economic
investment and land agreements. 2 9
3. Where Servitudes in Gross Run With the Land:
Commercial Restrictions
One type of in gross interest that has been enforced against
enforcement of servitudes [citing Bennett] ... this is not [such a case] ...." Garland v.
Rosenshein, 649 N.E.2d 756, 758 (Mass. 1995). The restriction in Garland, however, can be
differentiated from conservation servitudes in that it prohibited development of one parcel of
property in conjunction with another parcel, where the court determined that the sole benefit of the
restriction was one of "potential economic gain that the defendant may receive.., to release of
[the] restriction.... " Id. Conservation servitudes are not created to derive economic benefit, nor
are they created solely for the benefit of one individual's economic well-being.
224 See Section I[E][1]lb], supra.
2' See Netherton, supra note 41, at 556.
226 Id. Netherton further notes that "[w]hat was an excessive encumbrance and burden
to landowners a century ago may now be an essential facet of the system of land use regulation that
stabilizes the value of sites where development capital is committed for substantial periods of
time." Id. See also Welitoffv. Kohl, 147 A. 390, 393 (N.J. 1929) ("Frequently ... [a] restrictive
system enhances rather than depresses the value of the restricted lands,"),
227 Both of these considerations are represented in the tentative draft of the
RESTATmMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY. See Section lI[E][5].
22 Dana and Ramsey, supra note 9, at 45. See also Netherton, supra note 41, at 556
(Conservation servitudes prevent "irreversible depletion and destruction of resources which are
finite in quantity and must be shared with future generations.").
229 Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 33. Meaning that land trusts should not lose both
the consideration paid and their interest in the land.
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subsequent purchasers of the burdened estate are "commercial"
servitudes.23 0  These restrictions are typically not perceived as
furthering individual economic gain, such as the restriction struck down
by the court in Garland v. Rosenshein.3 ' In Garland, purchasers of
property brought an action against the original grantor to invalidate a
restriction prohibiting development of the property in conjunction with
an adjacent parcel.232 In finding the restriction unenforceable, the court
noted that the condition furthered only the personal economic interests
of the original grantor -- as the grantor did not own land or business
benefitted by the restriction, the servitude's limited value was only the
purchaser's payment for its release.233
Commercial restrictions have been upheld against challenge
even though their benefit is to a particular business concern, as opposed
to land itself.34 In Whittinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas,2
35 a purchaser
of land sued a shopping center developer and lessee of land retained by
the developer for violation of an anti-competitive deed restriction. In
enforcing the restriction, the court held that covenants against
competition may be considered to run with the land when they facilitate
"orderly and harmonious" development of land for commercial use.
236
a. The Policy Behind this Exception
The primary rationale for allowing these in gross restrictions to
run is that the benefit of the servitude "inures to the entire
community." '237 Even if this description properly fits the true nature of
a commercial servitude (where the benefit flows to the community itself
as much if not more than the particular business), it parallels the general
understanding of a conservation servitude: A restriction on land that
230 See, e.g., French, supra note 33, at 942 n.52. But see Dana & Ramsey, supra note
9, at 14 n.60 ("Not all states adopt the commercial I non-commercial distinction, and it has been
subjected to strong academic criticism."). Examples of "commercial" servitudes are non-
competition covenants and exclusive dealing clauses.
3I Garland v. Rosenshein, 649 N.E.2d 756 (Mass. 1995).
232Id.
23 Id. at 758.
23' French, supra note 33, at 942 n.52. See also Roberts, supra note 82, at 939 ("most
courts today regard an economic benefit to land as meeting the touch or concern test, whether at
law or in equity.").
232 Whittinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 390 N.E.2d 243 (Mass. 1979).
1
36 Id. See also Trosper v. Shoemaker, 227 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1949). The court held that
one accepting title to property containing a gas station, subject to a restriction that the grantee
continue to use petroleum products sold by the grantor, was bound by the condition. The deed had
expressly stated that the condition was part of the consideration for conveyance.
23 Hegi, supra note 70, at 119.
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provides a public benefit, without any one specific individual
exclusively deriving economic gain from its existence. As noted by
Lawrence Berger: "It is indeed difficult to articulate a policyjustifying
a distinction between physical and commercial enhancement ....
In this sense, much like the traditional negative easements, commercial
restrictions evidence exception in servitudes law because recognized
public interests are present. Conservation servitudes provide similar
justification for exclusion from the general prohibition on in gross
interests. Whether a court would extend the same consideration,
however, is another matter altogether.
4. Anchor Parcels
One method that has been utilized to avoid the prohibition
against in gross servitudes is acquisition of what is known as an "anchor
parcel." The land trust obtains fee ownership of a small portion of the
servient estate, to which the benefit may technically "attach." This
technique has been used by land trusts and scenic programs239 and may
serve to legitimize a servitude by bundling the promise's benefit with an
interest in land.2 4' Anchor parcels also help to alleviate many of the
policy concerns underlying the hostilities to in gross servitudes,
including the assumption that an adjacent landowner would be an easier
with whom to identify and negotiate.
Interests such as anchor parcels have been scrutinized by
courts. As noted by Roberts:
While it has been assumed that if a promisee owns any
land, 'however insignificant,' it will nonetheless
constitute a dominant estate, the courts which require
a dominant estate have rejected the idea that technical
title to land will suffice. If land is useless for
development purposes, it is not a dominant estate.21
238 Berger, supra note 36, at 214.
239 See French, supra note 33, at 942 n.52 (noting that anchor parcels were used in
creating scenic easements under highway beautification programs).
240 See Thomas, supra note 29, § 62.10, at 517.
241 Roberts, supra note 82, at 942 n.28. Roberts goes on to state that "[t]he only
possible justification for permitting useless land or technical title to serve as a dominant estate
would be avoidance of the rule against allowing enforcement of [servitudes] in gross. If that is the
desired goal, then it is better to simply say so rather than to make the requirement of a dominant
estate an empty formality." Id.
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The original Restatement of Property states that the burden on the
landowner should have a reasonable relation to the benefit received and
that "sham appurtenant servitudes should be treated as in gross
interests.
242
Although anchor parcels technically meet the appurtenance
requirement, they do not necessarily provide any more certain security
for the land trust, and should not be considered an outlet from the
common law requirements concerning in gross interests.
5. The Restatement (Third) of Property
The tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Property
removes the requirement that land be specifically benefited in order to
create a servitude. Section 2.6(b) explicitly states that the benefit may
be held personally, in gross, or as an appurtenant interest.243 The
drafters note that:
The purpose of the [original] prohibitory doctrine was
to limit benefits in gross because they posed greater
risks than appurtenant servitudes of creating benefits
in holders who could-not be identified or located. The
problems presented by covenant interests held in gross
can be better dealt with by rules covering validity of
servitude arrangements, enforcement, and modification
and termination, than by a blanket or partial
prohibition on benefits in gross.2 "
The proposed Restatement intends to override old rules that are deemed
to have "little modem utility" and that "frustrate intent. 2 4' Along with
the new Restatement's treatment of the touch and concern rule, 46 the
drafters are reformulating the relevant analysis as to servitude validity
and enforcement. Many of these changes reflect growing criticism of
the traditional common law doctrines and would effectively bypass
42 Id. See also Komgold , supra note 8, at 495 n.23 (Citing RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 537, illus. 4 (1944)).
243 Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 12, § 2.6, cmt. d at 64 notes that: "Under the rule
stated in this section, benefits of affirmative and negative covenants, as well as easements and
profits, can be held in gross." The commentary further adds that "[c]ovenants with benefits in
gross are primarily found in conservation and historic preservation servitudes .... Id. at 68.
2 "Id at69.245 Id. at61.
246 See discussion in Section ll[F][4], infra.
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many of the uncertainties faced by conservation servitudes.
F. Servitudes and the Touch and Concern Rule: Entering the
Wilderness of Mirrors
Since the famous decision of Spencer's Case, "covenants, and
subsequently equitable servitudes, in order to run with the land have
had to meet the requirement of touching or concerning the land held by
both the promisor and the promisee."247  The touch and concern
requirement mirrors the appurtenance requirement in most respects.
However, the touch and concern requirement may require more than
mere appurtenance, as it is often based upon the content of the
agreement.248 It goes without saying that in a covenant that dictates
what use the grantor may or may not make of land, the burden "touches
and concerns" the servient estate.2" A more difficult question arises in
relation to the benefit, where the difficulty and conflicting policies lie.
Appurtenance does not appear to be the strict rule for the touch and
concern doctrine,250 rather the issue is one of what type of effect (if any)
the servitude has on the benefited property.
1. Just What Does it Mean? Attempting to Define the
Touch and Concern Rule
Perhaps the most oft-cited 'test' of the touch and concern rule
is that formulated by Charles Clark, wherein he describes the rule as:
A measuring of the legal relations of the parties with and without the
covenant. If the promisor's legal relations in respect to the land in
question are lessened his legal interest as owner rendered less valuable
by the promisee the burden of the covenant touches or concerns that
land; if the promisee's legal relations in respect to that land are
increased - his legal interest as owner rendered more valuable by the
4'7 Roberts, supra note 82, at 936. See also Chase, supra note 3, § 6.04[2][a][iv], at
6-84. Generally, the touch and concern requirement applies equally to both affirmative and
negative covenants. See also Berger, supra note 36, at 217 (both types of promises must "extend
to the support of the thing conveyed.").
24 French, supra note 2, at 1272 n.55.
2'9 See Chase, supra note 3, § 6.04[2][a], at 6-87; 2 A.L.P., supra note 177, § 9.13(a),
at 376; Section I[F][1] infra.
' See 2 ALP., supra note 177, § 9.13(a), at 377 ("since the benefit of this type of
covenant enhances and preserves existing property values in the community, the benefit touches
and concerns' any land owned by the covenantee in the community.") See also 2 A.L.P. § 9.28,
at 443 ("the benefit can be said to 'touch and concern' any land within a reasonable distance from
the burdened lot.").
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promise - the benefit of the covenant touches or concerns the land.2 '
This interpretation separates "the question of whether the burden of a
covenant touches and concerns the promisor's land from the question of
whether the benefit of a covenant touches and concerns the promisee's
land." '252 Under the Clark test, the restriction does not have to benefit
specific land owned or used by the promisee, and the burden can run
with the restricted land even though there is an in gross benefit.2 3 This
interpretation is fundamentally different from that stated in the original
Restatement of Property, which requires the benefit to also touch and
concern land for the burden to run.254 The Clark test has been criticized
as being circular, in that "[a]ny covenant which is held to run with the
land will lessen its value; any which does not, will not.
255
Beyond such cryptic formulations, however, the touch and
concern requirement has been understood to advance a few principle
objectives: "[T]o limit servitudes to essentially landplanning functions,
to free land from essentially personal burdens accomplishing personal
benefits, and to maintain the policy goal of recognizing landownership
as a special asset .... 256 Though the policy debate behind these
objectives is discussed in the following section, it is interesting to
compare James Winokur's interpretation of the doctrine in the context
251 CHARLEs E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND INTERESTS WHICH "RuN WITH THE
LAND" 97 (2d ed. 1947) (restating the test presented in Harry A. Bigelow, The Content of
Covenants in Leases, 12 MICH. L. REV. 639 (1914))(emphasis added). See also Lex Pro Corp.
v. Snyder Enters., 671 P.2d 637, 639 (N.M. 1983).
The distinction between covenants which run with the land and covenants
which are personal, must depend upon the effect of the covenant on the
legal rights which otherwise would flow from the ownership of land and
which are connected with the land... the key question [is) whether the
covenant in purpose and effect substantially alter(s) these rights.
Eagle Enterprises v. Gross, 349 N.E.2d 816, 819 (N.Y.App. 1976) (quoting Neponsit Prop.
Owners' Assn. v. Emigrant Ind. Say. Bank, 15 N.E. 2d 793, 796 (N.Y. 1938)).
22 Chase, supra note 3, § 6.0412][a][iv], at 6-86. However, Clark goes on to state: "It
is necessary that this effect should be had upon the legal relations of the parties as owners of the
land in question, and not merely as members of the community in general, such as taxpayers, or
owners of other land, in order that the covenant may run." Clark, supra note 246, at 97. Though
this phrase is cryptic, it arguable tends to limit the argument that 'touch and concern' benefits could
be extended or viewed abstractly as to the entire community (as would arguably be necessary for
a conservation servitude).
" Chase, supra note 3, at 6-87.
"A RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 537 and 543(2)(a) (1944). See also discussion,
Section 1[1D] [2], supra.
255 Epstein, supra note 36, at 1362 n. 18.
1 James L. Winokur, Ancient Strands Rewoven, or Fashioned Out of Whole Cloth?:
First Impressions of the Emerging Restatement ofServitudes, 27 CONN. L. REv. 131, 142 (1994).
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of privately held conservation servitudes. First, conservation servitudes
are, in essence, land use planning devices, as they are a means of
maintaining natural open space areas against the push of commercial
and residential development. Second, conservation servitudes are not
"personal burdens; their benefits inure to the entire community, the
holder of the restriction does not seek or obtain a discrete benefit that
is not also available to the general public. 257  Finally, holders of
conservation servitudes recognize the importance of land ownership by
paying valuable consideration for the restriction, while the grantor
retains fee title ownership. The landowner is typically allowed to
maintain the existing use of the property, without any affirmative
obligations to benefit the servitude holder.
In this sense, conservation servitudes intrinsically do no
violence to the basic objectives underlying the touch and concern rule.
Winokur notes that "substantial authority has permitted public and other
landless institutions to enforce servitudes (at least in equity) despite the
appurtenance principle."25 Indeed, Clark himself recognized that "[i]n
view of the general social policy which very clearly upholds restrictions
on the use of property, it would seem proper that such agreements
should be enforced without regard to the accident 'of the plaintiffs
ownership of property in the vicinity." '259 This has been the approach
adopted by the proposed Restatement (Third) of Property. 60
2. The Great Policy Debate (Part H): The Touch and
Concern Rule and the Law of Servitudes
As noted by Cyril Fox:
The "touch and concern" requirement, however it may
21 The importance of this consideration was demonstrated in Garland v. Rosenshein,
649 N.E.2d 756 (Mass. 1995), wherein the court struck down a land use restriction on the basis
that the only benefit being derived from the restriction was the potential of economic gain that the
holder would receive from payment for release of the restriction.
' Winokur, supra note 256, at 144 (citing Conestoga Pines Homeowners' Ass'n v.
Black, 689 P.2d 1 76 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Merionette Manor Homes Improvement Ass'n v.
Heda, 136 N.E.2d 556 (I11. Ct  App. 1956)). As is evident, the majority of cases allowing landless
institutions to enforce restrictions involve homeowners associations; which Winokur notes that
"It]he usual explanation under the old touch and concern rule has been that such institutional
enforcers are merely acting as intended, on behalf of affected landowners." Id. Of course, this
rationale might be also extended to a land trust organization, wherein its members live within close
proximity to the restricted land.
'9 Clark, supra note 251, at 110.
See Section II[F][41, infra.
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be described, really raises a policy issue for
determination by the court: Is this the kind of promise
that society should permit to bind a person who did not
make it, or that society should permit to be enforced by
a person to whom it was not made?26'
The touch and concern requirement is arguably nothing more or less
than "a method of restricting kinds of promises that may devolve to
remote parties." '262 Although the rule has been described as an objective
inquiry,263 in fact it has been applied in an inconsistent, chaotic fashion,
leading many commentators, including the drafters of the tentative
Restatement, to seek its abolition.2" The reason for this uneven
approach is, like the theories surrounding the appurtenance
requirement, based upon policy objectives found within traditional
property law. The policy arguments can be narrowed down to
essentially the views of two scholars, Uriel Reichman and Richard
Epstein.
a. Policy Favoring the Touch and Concern
Restriction - Uriel Reichman
As with the prohibition against benefits in gross, the primary
rationale behind the application of the touch and concern rule has been
concern over alienability or, more specifically, keeping land free of
"unduly burdensome" or "obsolete" restrictions. To Reichman, the
permanent imposition of personal restrictions on land hinders the
efficiency of a private land holding system.265 In arguing for
maintenance of the touch and concern doctrine, Reichman points to the
subjective and, what he views as short-sighted motivation behind such
personal servitudes: "Obligations not related to actual property use are
highly individualized... [and therefore tend] to become inefficient
... Fox, supra note 45, at 7.
252 Berger, supra note 36, at 208. A basic response to this inquiry is: if the public in
general is also the beneficiary of a conservation servitude, is there in fact only a "remote" party or
interest?
263 Id. at 210. To be fair, Berger does not claim that the test is indeed objective; rather,
he notes only that courts have tried to apply it as such. Moreover, Reichman notes that "[t]he
courts are not involved in measuring efficiency gains; this is clearly the prerogative of the parties.
The courts only deny the permanency of agreements clearly unrelated to land use." Reichman,
supra note 34, at 1233. With a conservation servitude, the question is: When does such a
restriction not relate to land use?26 See subsections H[F] [3] and [41, infra.
26 Reichman, supra note 34, at 1233.
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[shortly] following a transfer.
266
When applying this mode of thought toward conservation
servitudes, a good deal may depend on what in fact is considered
"inefficient." Under the Reichman analysis, a conservation servitude
may be deemed inefficient from the start; for even though it clearly
relates to use of the land (and is not technically "personal"), it still
maintains a restriction wherein the benefit is arguably intangible and
does not flow to an identifiable and distinct property.
Reichman's second argument in defense of the touch and
concern rule is that servitudes are analogous to private regulation of
land use that bind subsequent owners of the burdened property.16
Power on the part of private citizens should be limited to "objective
purposes," meaning those that pass muster under the touch and concern
doctrine as implemented by the courts, to avoid sacrificing the
"objectives of a private land holding system. 268
b. Policy Favoring Elimination of the Touch and
Concern Requirement - Richard Epstein
Along with the rationales that favor the running of benefits in
gross, arguments against the touch and concern requirement point to
frustration of intent, and a realization of modem economic and social
realities. As noted by Berger, the fundamental argument against the
touch and concern rule is that it is "based on an ostensibly logical but
actually unsound policy foundation." '269
Epstein argues that adherence to the touch and concern doctrine
ignores the intent of the parties at two fundamental levels. First, by
invalidating a servitude, the rule ignores the express intent and belief of
the parties that the restriction does in fact touch and concern the land.27
Second, the rule subordinates a valid arms-length agreement between
the original parties to unascertained third parties, who at least at the
creation of the agreement, have no "proprietary claim" as to the use of
the burdened property.2 7'




' Id. Indeed, Reichman refers to the potential imposition of such restrictions as
"creating modem variations of feudal serfdom." Id.
26 Berger, supra note 36, at 211.
27 See, e.g., Epstein, supra 36, at 1359.
271 Id at 1360. Both of these rationales lie in the policy of freedom of contract,
discussed more fully at Section If[G], infra.
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efficiency do not compel imposition of the touch and concern
requirement: "If a seller insists that a personal covenant bind the land
even though it works to the disadvantage of the immediate or even
future purchasers, then the seller will have to accept a reduction in the
purchase price to make good his sentiments." '272 Subsequent purchasers
are not unreasonably burdened by imposition of the servitude because
they have notice of the restriction from the land records, this restriction
being the expressed intent of the original parties, and can structure a
purchase to account for the land's reduced value resulting from
enforceability of the servitude.
As to the inefficiency of a servitude, Epstein argues that there
is no independent set of "objectives" by which to state that the
restriction does not promote "efficient" land use.273  In addition,
Epstein argues that the touch and concern rule does not reduce
transaction costs: "So long as the original holder of a covenant or his
successor(s) in title are free to [negotiate for] repurchase the servitude
in question, the rule... only changes the identity of the party that must
initiate the transaction. ' '274
3. Difficulty and Criticism of the Touch and
Concern Rule
Under the evident policy conflict, courts, commentators, and
authorities have increasingly criticized the touch and concern rule in
that it "complicates many transactions whose validity should go
unchallenged...,275 and makes it "difficult, if not impossible, to protect
property through the creation of real covenants. '2 76 As noted by the
proposed Restatement (Third) of Property, criticism of the doctrine has
increased due to "its obscurity, its intent-defeating character, and its
growing redundancy [which has] become increasingly apparent., 27
A good deal of this criticism arises from the fact that there is no
clear understanding or definition of what the rule actually requires.
Courts, in attempting to apply the doctrine, do so inconsistently, using
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 1361.
275 Id. at 1362.
276 Davidson Bros., Inc. v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc., 579 A.2d 288,291 (N.J. 1990). "The
concept is so difficult to pin down that it can rarely be used as a basis for predicting the
enforceability of a particular covenant.' French, supra note 33, at 939.
277 Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 3.2, at 21.
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abstract language in a variety of widely divergent contexts.278 Indeed,
a primary reason urged for abolition of the doctrine is that the touch and
concern requirement has become too amorphous and over-broad to
achieve any purposeful benefit.279 Although commentators observe that
the doctrine serves a useful function of determining whether the
agreement is objectionable on policy grounds, 20 the criticism is that the
doctrine over-extends itself. Instead, it has been argued that "courts
should identify the policy considerations that cut against the running of
a covenant, and address those policy concerns directly rather than
indirectly through the touch and concern requirement."
2"1
As noted by French, where a court invalidates a servitude on
the determination that it does not touch and concern the land, the court
is making a subjective judgement that the restriction "should not be
permitted to run with the land."2" The touch and concern rule is no
longer just a requirement for creation of a covenant, it operates as a
termination doctrine as well."' As pointed out by the tentative draft of
the Restatement, litigation surrounding servitudes usually arises only
where the agreement becomes inconvenient for one of the parties.
2
The argument follows that, as other doctrines (such as changed
conditions) that are considered more satisfactory and effective in
invalidating servitudes have developed in the law the need for the
"obsolete and confusing rhetoric" of the touch and concern rule is no
See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 29, § 62.08, at 510-11.
270 Chase, supra note 3, § 6.04[2][a][iv], at 6-85. Davidson Bros. 579 A.2d at 296
("many past illogical and contorted applications of the touch and concern' rules have resulted
because courts have been pressed to twist the rles... in order to achieve a result that comports
with public policy and a free market."); Berger, supra note 36, at 209 ("those undertakings that
touch and concern and those that are merely collateral tend to shade into the other."); Epstein,
supra note 36, at 1363 ("When the status of a servitude is uncertain, the touch and concern
requirement merely introduces an additional transactional barrier to subsequent transfers of real
estate.'").
280 Chase, supra note 3, § 6.04 [2][a][iv], at 6-85.
Aspects of the 'touch and concern' test ... remain useful in evaluating the
reasonableness of a covenant, insofar as it aids the courts in differentiating
between promises that were intended to bind only the individual parties to
a land conveyance and promises affecting the use and value of the land that
was intended to be passed on to subsequent parties.
Davidson Bros., 579 A.2d at 296.
281 Chase, supra note 3, § 6.04 [2][a][iv], at 6-85 to 6-86.
282 French, supra note 33, at 939. See also Chase, supra note 3, § 6.04[2][a][iv][A],
at 6-88.
'2' See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 3.2, at 21.
Id.
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longer apparent nor warranted.285
In light of the criticism it is not surprising that touch and
concern rule abolishment has been advocated by both commentator and
court alike. 86 This position has been adopted by the tentative draft of
the Restatement (Third) of Property.
4. The Restatement (Third) of Property: Touch and
Concern Superseded
Section 3.2 of the tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of
Property expressly states that "[n]either the burden nor the benefit of a
[servitude] is required to 'touch or concern' land." '287 According to the
drafters, the effect of this new rule is to "reformulate the inquiry so that
the appropriate question is whether the servitude arrangement violates
public policy."2 The new rule still leaves room for many of the policy
arguments that were advanced through the touch and concern rule by
courts and commentators: "Servitudes that formerly were held invalid
for failure to touch or concern land remain invalid under the rules stated
in this Chapter if they impose unreasonable restraints on alienation,
undue restraints on trade, or if they are unconscionable or lack a
rational justification.2 89
Rather than merging all of these considerations under one
amorphous doctrine, validation or termination of a servitude is left for
separate determination under specific rules and considerations provided
within the Restatement.290 As noted by the American Law of Real
Property, this approach "usefully proposes to separate out for more
precise individual treatment many validity questions that might
I!d.
2" Perhaps, as the court stated in Davidson Bros., "[tihe time has come to cut the
gordian knot . . ." in that "[r]igid adherence to the 'touch and concern' test as a means of
determining the enforceability of a restrictive covenant is [no longer] warranted." Davidson Bros.,
Inc. v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc., 579 A.2d 288, 295 (N.J. 1990).
Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 3.2, at 20.
2 Id. This method arguably satisfies the majority of critics to the touch and concern
doctrine. As stated by the court in Davidson Bros.: "Reasonableness, not esoteric concepts of
property law, should be the guiding inquiry into the validity of covenants at law." Davidson Bros.,
579 A.2d at 295.
2" Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 3.2 at 20.
2'0 See generally: Tentative Draft No.2, supra note 5, § 3.1 (General Rule); § 3.4
(Direct Restraints on Alienation); § 3.5 (Indirect Restraints on Alienation); § 3.6 (Unreasonable
Restraints on Trade or Competition); and § 3.7 (Unconscionability). Thus, many of the policies




otherwise be lumped together under the touch and concern rubric."
' 9'
So long as the same considerations and policies are individually
advanced by the Restatement's requirements for servitude validity and
enforcement, there is a tremendous benefit and clarity to be derived
from abolition of the old touch and concern doctrine. Courts will be
able to look to identical public policies under the Restatement's
formulation, and private parties will have the benefit of greater certainty
in land use planning arrangements.
G. Freedom of Contract Versus Freedom of Alienability
One of the fundamental conflicts in the validation and
enforcement of servitudes is that of freedom of contract versus free
alienability and use of land.2 92 An initial question presented, however,
is whether one may argue that restrictions such as conservation
servitudes indeed follow or fit within the traditional contemplation of
contract law. As Korngold highlights, covenants running with the land
are distinguishable from contract law in two fundamental ways. First,
the law of servitudes and interests running with the land predate modem
contract law.293 Second, "traditional bilateral contract analysis does not
easily lend itself to [the law of servitudes], which are enforceable not
only by the original covenantee against the original covenantor but also
by and against their [successors]." 2" This difference, for theoretical
purposes, may be gapped in that both servitudes and bilateral contract
agreements "seek to effectuate arrangements created by private
volition," and policies underlying freedom of contract may be equally
applied to interests running with the land.29
Conservation servitudes exasperate these two conflicting
policies, because the imposition of a preservation restriction by the
original parties has the effect of "hindering future economic
development, marketability of the land, and subsequent purchasers'
291 Chase, supra note 3, §6.04[2][a][iv], at 6-86.
292 Komgold, supra note 8, at 447.
293 Id. at 448.
2
9 Id. Komgold surmises, the strict requirements that have developed around servitudes
law arose out of concern of enforcing such agreements against parties who did not specifically
agree to it. Id. As discussed supra, however, it has been argued that since such future "third
parties" as yet have no interest in the property, their interests should not be part of the
consideration in determining whether to uphold the validity of the servitude.
295 d at 449. Though this tension has been repeatedly presented to courts, they have
often avoided discussion of the matter and have based their decisions on "narrow legal grounds
with close attention to precedent. Id. at 467.
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ability to use the property consistently with their wishes."2 These
restrictions, deemed restraints on alienation, along with the perpetual
nature of the interest created,297 squarely place conservation servitudes
at the center of the debate. As noted by Dana and Ramsey, both sides
involve liberty claims.29
1. The Great Policy Debate (Part 1I): Balancing the
Freedoms
a. Policies in Favor of Alienability
There are two primary arguments behind the pro-alienation
perspective: (i) democratic values; and (ii) flexibility of land use.
i. The Promotion of Democratic Control
of the Land
As demonstrated in the in gross and touch and concern
discussions, democratic values are implicated by the creation of a
conservation servitude in that private agreements affect public land use
goals.2 Whereas in typical land use decisions the public planning and
zoning methods are used to effectuate goals, no similar public
participation is present in the creation of a conservation servitude,
"effectively allowing a single [person] to determine the use of the land,
to the possible detriment of the community.
30 0
This concern is deepened by what is known as "dead-hand"
control of the land. Essentially, dead-hand control locks the use of land
in an inefficient or obsolete use, possibly where the beneficiary of the
servitude agreement is so far removed in interest that it can no longer
296 Baldwin, supra note 14, at 112.
' Dana & Ramsey observed that:
Despite recognitions that future events may operate to destroy the
conservation values of [the servitude], the general understanding is that
conservation [servitudes] donated in perpetuity will exist for a long time -
at least for several generations. Thus, when considering enforceability of
conservation [servitudes], courts are asked to accept the long-disfavored
dead-hand control over land use for the ostensibly greater public good of
land preservation.
Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 23-24.
2 I. d at24.
' Baldwin, supra note 14, at 112. See also Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 25.
o Baldwin, supra note 14, at 112. See also Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 25.
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be said that the promisee is still deriving any valuable benefit from the
servitude. As put by one commentator, "[i]t is socially desirable that
the wealth of the world be controlled by its living members and not by
the dead." '' In regard to a land trust holding the benefit of a servitude,
however, this policy objection fails for two reasons. Governmental
entities and land trusts do not "die," so that concerns over literal dead-
hand control are not applicable. Second, these entities are not immune
from public influence and goals.
The second concern of democratic values is tied into preclusion
of land use. Not only is there the threat of dead-hand control at
present, but this control may be imposed on future generations and
subsequently bind their choices as well.302 Where landowners enter
arrangements that restrict the land for future uses in agreements that run
with the burdened estate without chance for release, land itself becomes
"an exhaustible resource., 303
This concern operates on the premise that parties to a servitude
agreement have limited foresight. To permit their preferences to govern
land use for an unlimited duration would be to forever "resolve against
future generations difficult questions . . ." of land use policy and
decision.3"4 This imperfect foresight is coupled with a limited (current)
understanding of economic and social preferences, preferences that can
change over time. Consequently the efficiency of servitudes that do not
implicitly allow for modification by negotiation is further limited.3°5
ii.. Freedom and Flexibility of Land Use
This aspect of the pro-alienability argument addresses
intertwined concerns: Hindering economic development (or creating
economic inefficiencies) and land marketability. Opponents of
conservation servitudes point to the possibility of restrictions having the
- Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 24 (citing L. SLMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD
HAND 59(1955)).
302 See Baldwin, supra note 14, at 112; Dana& Ramsey, supra note 9, at 25.
303 Sterk, supra note 46, at 638.
Id. at 617. The author further states that permitting the original parties' restrictions
to control land use for extended or infinite durations "might frustrate even their own preferences
for the future," as such transactions only assume that both parties fully understand what is in their
own best interest and to how to pursue it. Id. at 618. However, it is difficult to conclude that a
party, in bargaining and paying valuable consideration for the restriction to last in perpetuity, does
not understand or intend the end result of the servitude agreement. Indeed, conservation
organizations precisely intend for the restriction on land use to last in perpetuity, or at least until
circumstances so change as to no longer wan-ant imposition of the servitude.
"5 Id. at 632.
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effect of distorting future "patterns of land development, thereby
imposing burdens on future landowners and neighbors by depressing
land values in general."3 6 This effect on parties outside of the original
agreement is an economic externality created by the conservation
servitude. It subjects third parties to the burden, and may increase
transaction costs when seeking to have the restriction removed. 7 Even
though these associated "costs" may be purely speculative or difficult
to ascertain, the argument is advanced by proponents of unrestrained
alienability that the potential imposition of these costs alone is
sufficient to qualify freedom of contract 0
b. Policies in Favor of Freedom of Contract
The arguments in favor of interests such as conservation
servitudes present both familiar and new policies to the debate.
i . Fairness and Intent
As with the in gross and touch and concern debate, one of the
key arguments for freedom of contract is fairness to the intent of the
parties. Essentially, this returns to the argument that a landowner
"should not be able to make a promise in exchange for consideration
and then ... extinguish the promise by conveying the land."309 The
court in Van Sant v. Rose31 noted that private parties have a right to
contract as to the use of the land, and that these agreements "entered
into freely and voluntarily must be held sacred and be enforced by the
courts."3 1' This ability to contract allows private parties to exercise
choice in respect to land, "a value so ingrained in our culture and legal
3 Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 25. This position would arguably fail, however,
where a conservation servitude enhances the value of surrounding land. In example, housing
developments would likely have a much higher value located adjacent to an open space than next
to commercial development. In fact, there is a growing recognition in land development to utilize
open space for future development. See RANDALL ARENDT, RURAL BY DESIGN: MAINTAINING
SMALL TOWN CHARACTER (1994).
- See Sterk, supra note 46, at 617.
"Id. at 622.
"0 See Komgold, supra note 8, at 450. See Sections ll[E][l]fb][i] and lFfI[2]b,
supra.
310 Vant Sant v. Rose, 103 N.E. 194 (Il1. 1913).
"' Id. at 196. See also Korngold, supra note 8, at 450 ("the recent groundswell of
support for unifying covenants at law, equitable servitudes, and easements into a single law of
'servitudes' springs from the desire to facilitate enforceable consensual land use arrangements free
from unwarranted court interference.").
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tradition...,,3 12 that non-enforcement of the servitude would deprive
parties of the fundamental right to freedom of contract."'
Coupled with this principle is the fact that a prospective
purchaser suffers no loss of choice in light of the servitude restriction,
since the sale price of the property would most likely reflect the
encumbrance." 4 The covenantor's successor, having notice of the
restriction and "presumably tailoring his bargain accordingly, should
not be able to evade the promise."31 In this respect, the restrictive land
use agreement presents an economic choice in the land market.'
1 6
Present owners of the burdened estate, by their own volition, make a
reasonable determination to receive compensation in return for allowing
the restriction on the use of their land,317 and subsequent owners are not
involuntarily subjected to the restriction due to notice and an ability to
negotiate for a reduced price. It is further argued that speculative
externalities, in and of themselves, should not determine whether a
servitude is valid as against a subsequent purchaser.1
... Korngold, supra note 8, at 454.
.. Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 26. As stated by Epstein:
Private property is an institution that fosters individualized, if not eccentric,
preferences; it does not stamp them out. We may not understand why
property owners want certain obligations to run with the land, but as it is
their land, not ours, some very strong reason should be advanced before our
intentions are allowed to control.
Epstein, supra note 36, at 1359.
"' Baldwin, supra note 14, at 113.
.. Komgold, supra note 8, at 451.
36 See Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 26.
"' Sterk observed that:
A landowner who agrees to the imposition of a servitude on his land has
presumably considered the effects the servitude will have on his land. He
will agree to imposition of the servitude only so long as he receives
consideration that he values as much or more than the interests he
relinquishes. Conversely, the party seeking to benefit from the servitude
will only offer consideration that he values as little or less than the interest
he acquires. If a servitude is imposed it is only because both parties believe
that the transaction makes them better off. To the extent that the legal
system, by legislative or judge-made rule, refuses to enforce such
servitudes, it discourages transactions that benefit both parties.
Sterk, supra note 46, at 620.
3 Id. at 623.
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ii. No Actual Restraint on Alienation or
Future Choice
Beyond the policies of intent and fairness, arguments advancing
freedom of contract also point to actual results in support of their
argument: "That such [servitudes] may be unwise is one point; that
they should be banned on conceptual grounds is quite another." '3 19
Restrictive covenants in general,3 20 and conservation servitudes
in particular,32" ' have been found not to violate the rule against restraints
on alienation. As stated by the court in Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v.
Kerr:322 "A restraint on alienation acts to bar conveyance by any
means. However, while a restriction on use may limit the enjoyment of
property, it is not a restraint on alienation .... It is only when an
absolute title is involved that the doctrine preventing restraint upon
alienation applies." '323
Even where a servitude is donated in perpetuity, legal doctrines
exist (such as changed conditions) that would preclude the continual
running or enforcement of obsolete or unduly burdensome restrictions.
In addition, a land trust may be willing to release the restriction if it is
no longer producing its desired effect or the organization feels that its
resources would be better directed elsewhere. 24 The local nature of
most land trusts "militates against the charge that [such groups]
constrain democratic land-use planning ... "325 and values. Being
"local" requires the organization to be sensitive to regional economic
and social needs, and subjects it to local political pressure as well.3 26
As a result, conservation servitudes do not implicate concerns over
319 Epstein, supra note 36, at 1360 n.14.
'
20 See Van Sant v. Rose, 103 N.E. 194, 196 (Ill. 1913). "Restrictions imposed upon
the use [of land] which are not undue, but limited only, are not in violation of the law." Id
32 Village of Ridgewood v. Bolger Found., 517 A.2d 135 (N.J. 1996) (conservation
servitude given by taxpayer in perpetuity to conservation foundation for preservation of open
space, which prohibited any act or use detrimental to preservation of property in its natural state,
and reserved access for sole purpose of insuring compliances with terms and conditions of
servitude, did not violate rule against restraints on alienation).
322 Automatic SprinklerCorp. v. Kerr, No. 11-017,1986 WL 7307 (Oh. Ct. App. 1986).
323 id. at *2.
24 See Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 29. The determination that there is no longer
a benefit being derived from the servitude may be provided by denial of tax reduction
(conservation servitudes must provide a public benefit to qualify as a deductible contribution).
Id. at 30. See also Automatic Sprinkler 1986 WL 7307, *2.
"2 5Dana& Ramsey, supra note 9, at 30. Even national land preservation organizations,




alienation and dead -hand control of the land.
Some commentators have claimed that conservation restrictions
actually maintain choice as to land use, in that present development can
preclude future, and perhaps more valuable, decisions as to land use,
32s
and can result in an even more permanent form of dead-hand control. 29
Not only is there loss of land use choice to future generations, the
permanent loss of environmental aesthetical values, once removed, can
no longer be recaptured.33 °
2. The Restatement (Third) of Property: Indirect
Restraints on Alienation
Section 3.5 of the tentative draft states that:
A servitude is not invalid because it indirectly restrains
alienation by limiting the use that can be made of
property, by reducing the amount realized by the
owner on sale or other transfer of the property, or by
otherwise reducing the value of the property, unless
there is no rational justification for the servitude.331
The purpose of this provision is to give effect to the intentions of the
parties "unless there is a substantial reason to disregard them.'332
Further, comment d states:
" Id. at 29.
32 See Baldwin, supra note 14, at 113.
... David Farrier, Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentivesfor Management
or Compensation for Lost Expectations?, 19 HARV. ENVrL. L. REv. 303, 344 (1995).
330 As noted by Sterk, decisions to destroy historic or preservation interests are not
reversible:
Even if future generations would value these items far more than the present
generation does, future generations cannot trade their resources to reverse
the earlier decisions. Thus, even though concerns about intergenerational
fairness do not require the present generation to avoid irreversible
decisions, economists... have recognized the need to provide protection
... against decisions to remove natural (or manmade) treasures when '[a]ll
the wealth and resources of future generations will not suffice to restore
them.'
Sterk supra note 46, at 637-38 (quoting Baumol, On the Social Rate of Discount, 58 AM. EcoN.
REV. 788, 801 (1968)).
"' Tentative Draft No. 2. Supra note 5, at § 3.5 at 76.
33' Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 3.5, Reporter's note at 80.
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Use restrictions on property are valid even though they
severely reduce the value of the property, so long as
there is some rational justification for the restriction.
Use of the property for open space, protection of
views, historic preservation, and conservation of
habitat for plants and animals provides a rational
justification for restrictions that severely limit the
value and potential market for property.333
The proposed Restatement largely resolves the balancing of the
freedoms, providing for greater freedom of contract (through the
rationale of intent), subject to the requirement of a viable basis for the
servitude that does not violate public policy. In addition, the tentative
draft expressly validates the use of conservation servitudes.
H. Notice and the Role of Recording Statutes
The comprehensive use of recording systems in the United
States has loaned credence to the argument that a purchaser of a
burdened estate should be held subject to the servitude regardless of
whether the benefit is held in gross or meets the touch and concern
requirement. Despite past concerns of imposing obligations or
restrictions on an unsuspecting landowner, the use of recording statutes
has effectively eliminated this problem. 34 As noted by Korngold:
"Because the holder of a servitude must record it or risk losing it to a
bona fide purchaser [of the burdened land], a potential purchaser easily
can identify outstanding claims and negotiate for their removal or adjust
his price accordingly."335 This capability can actually increase the
marketability of land, as it allows prospective purchasers of the
burdened estate to make informed decisions regarding the nature and
costs of the restrictions imposed on the land.336 In this sense, searching
for restrictions is no more burdensome or costly than a routine
... Id. at cmt. d, 79.
" See, e.g., French, supra note 33, at 941 ("Despite variations in wording, American
recording statutes everywhere should protect the unknowing against unrecorded servitudes of all
types ").
"'33 Korngold, supra note 8, at 456. Thus, the statutes place an affirmative role on the
owner of the benefit to protect his interest by providing notice.
336 French, supra note 2, at 1284.
[VOL. 13:1
CONSERVATION SERVITUDES
examination of ownership, which should be performed anyway."3 7 Not
only do the recording acts provide a mechanism by which notice may
be obtained, they also allow a prospective purchaser of a burdened
estate to determine with whom he may deal to obtain a release of the
restriction.33
In this context, it has been argued that "[t]he purchase of land,
when combined with a system of recordation, provides constructive
consent on the part of a purchaser to the previous state of affairs
between the immediate seller and any other person who holds a
servitude over land." '339 Using this rationale, courts have granted
equitable enforcement of restrictive land use arrangements against
subsequent purchasers of the burdened estate with notice.' ° Though
this has favorable implications for holders of recorded conservation
servitude agreements, it should not be interpreted or practiced literally.
While constructive notice alleviates many of the concerns inherent in
land purchases, it should not serve as a substitute for other
considerations derived from common law that promote social policy.34" '
I. How Long is "Forever?" Duration and Termination of
Conservation Servitudes
Though the policy arguments may be pushed either way, the
fact remains that there are "legitimate concerns to be raised over
locking property into certain fixed uses with no opportunity for
change."342 This concern has been the primaryjustification in common
"7 Epstein notes that such a search "channels the search... and thereby protects those
who make the search with a completeness that the common-law rules could not provide." Epstein,
supra note 36, at 1356. Not only is such a search no more burdensome, it is also more effective
than the appurtenance requirement.
"s Id. at 1355.
".. Id. at 1357.
340 See 7 G. THOMPsON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 3170, at 179 (1962)
[hereinafter Thompson] "A court of equity will enforce any agreement affecting land against a
purchaser with notice of it." Id Although one should not accept this blanket statement without
reserve, there is substantive case law to support the notion that restrictive agreements may be
enforced where a purchaser is charged with notice. See Davidson Bros. Inc., v. D. Katz Inc., 579
A.2d 288, 292 (N.J. 1990); Pratte v. Balatsos, 113 A.2d 492, 494-96 (N.H. 1955); Sun Oil Co.
v. Trent Auto Wash Inc., 150 N.W. 818, 820-21 (Mich. 1967); Van Sant v. Rose, 103 N.E. 194,
196-97 (Il1. 1913); Lex Pro Corp. v. Snyder Enters., 671 P.2d 637, 639 (N.M. 1983); Harris v.
Pease, 66 A.2d 590, 592 (Conn. 1949).
" For example, although the new Restatement reformulates servitude analysis so as to
supersede both the strict (and arguably out-dated) appurtenance and touch and concern
requirements, it still retains sufficient and effective analysis to ensure that a servitude does not
violate recognized public policy. Notice should not provide an exception.
342 Hamilton, supra note 24, at 487.
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law doctrines and statutory provisions for practical limitations on
perpetual servitudes in general, and conservation servitudes in
particular.343 Legal doctrines such as changed conditions and relative
hardship have developed to "allow termination of a seemingly perpetual
real covenant or deny specific enforcement and allow only a damages
remedy."3" Therefore, in order to understand conservation servitudes,
it is important to briefly look at these two doctrines.
1. The Relative Hardship Doctrine
The doctrine of relative hardship is an equitable defense raised
by a landowner seeking relief from servitude restrictions. The doctrine
presents the issue of whether the harm (if any) that will result to the
landowner from enforcement of the servitude substantially outweighs
the benefit to the land trust derived from enforcing the agreement.345
The original Restatement of Property states the doctrine as follows:
"Injunctive relief against [a] violation of the obligation arising out of a
promise respecting the use of land will be denied if the harm done by
granting the injunction will be disproportionate to the benefits secured
thereby."3" Although the doctrine's standard has varied,3 47 several
arguments have been advanced against use of the doctrine with
conservation servitudes.
One noted difficulty with its application is that the doctrine
itself provides little guidance in how the courts should analyze and
apply the defense, "yet, the doctrine is meaningful only if courts are
prepared to give full and accurate value both to landowner concerns and
to the conservation objectives explicitly protected by conservation
[servitudes]."3 a Komgold notes that the focus of the doctrine is too
"' Id. Examples of statutory limits on perpetual servitudes are marketable title statutes,
which extinguish land use restrictions after a specified period of time, or where the parties do not
renew their agreement. Such statutory provisions, as they are unique to each jurisdiction, are
beyond the scope of this survey.
' Komgold, supra note 8, at 495 n. 117.
... Chase, supra note 3, § 6.0516] [a], at 6-123.
3" RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 563 (1944). "Examples of personal hardship arising
from a conservation servitude include a covenant restriction barring the fee owner from building
a second home on the property . . and the inability of a fee title owner to use the land in a manner
that provides adequate revenues to pay property taxes .... "). Korngold, supra note 8, at 462
n.142 (citing Benton v Bush, 644 S.W.2d 690 (Tn.App. 1982)).
"'See Komgold, supra note 8, at 486.
'4 Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 38. As the authors note: "Several states recognize
this difficulty and prohibit the weighing of economic benefits in passing on the validity of a
conservation easement. . 'No comparative economic test shall be used to determine whether a
conservation easement is beneficial to the public. Id. at 38 n. 164 (quoting IOWA CODE ANN. §
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narrow to encompass conservation or public interests. 9 Further,
repeated use of the doctrine by the courts to terminate conservation
servitudes interferes with the reasonable expectations of the land
trust.35 The doctrine also raises legitimate concerns as to what
standard the "hardship" should be evaluated against. As recognized by
Dana and Ramsey: "Courts should be especially reluctant to apply the
doctrine in cases when the owner of the servient estate pleads economic
hardship, particularly when the landowner had notice that the property
was burdened by [the restriction]." 35' This is equally true for the
original grantor, who received consideration for creation of the
restriction and for subsequent purchasers with notice, who purchased
the property with knowledge of the restriction, and had the ability to
tailor the purchase price accordingly.
2. The Changed Conditions Doctrine
Under the changed conditions doctrine, courts may refuse to
equitably enforce restrictions on the use of property that are obsolete or
unduly burdensome.352 The rationale behind the doctrine is that, even
though servitudes are freely entered into at arm's length, eventually
restrictions may become useless for the grantee and oppressive to the
grantor. Although the doctrine may prohibit specific enforcement of
the restriction, it generally does not preclude a recovery for damages.353
In the case of conservation servitudes, this can occur where
"surrounding land uses have changed so radically as to destroy the
I11D.2 (West Supp. 1988)).
" Kongold, supra note 8, at 488. As the benefit derived from a conservation servitude
is often immeasurable, courts should be extremely reluctant to invalidate the agreement on the
basis of hardship, especially where more relevant and defined doctrines, such as changed
conditions, may be applicable.
35 Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 38. In addition, the authors note that the
landowner's windfall gain in having the servitude terminated works to the detriment of society in
general.
'351 Id. at 42.
" Id. at 39. "If, by reason of changed conditions such benefit has so largely ceased to
exist that it would be inequitable to enforce the restriction, equitable enforcement will be denied."
Welitoffv. Kohl, 147 A. 390, 392 (N.J. 1929).
... See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 46, at 653. See also Chase, supra note 3, § 6.0516][b],
at 6-125. Of course, it is uncertain how often a conservation organization would seek monetary
damages. In this sense, the author argues that the changed conditions doctrine should prohibit
enforcement both legally and equitably, because allowing an action for damages leaves the
restriction as a cloud on title. Id.
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benefits flowing from the restrictions.'
a. Standards for the Changed Conditions Doctrine
Where servitude enforcement is challenged under the changed
conditions doctrine, the question is not as to the validity of the
servitude's purpose, but whether it should be equitably enforced in light
of current realities. 3"' The burden of proving a change of conditions
sufficient to deny enforcement of the servitude is upon the burdened
landowner, as he is the one who "seeks to escape an apparently valid
and permanent arrangement and who stands to benefit from termination
of the restrictions. 3 6
The mere fact that the land will become more valuable (whether
for commercial or developmental purposes) if the servitude is
terminated provides no basis for applying the changed conditions
doctrine.3"7 Nor does a change in zoning, in and of itself, constitute
sufficient cause to relinquish the restrictions.S Beyond these specific
circumstances, however, there is no bright line rule for the changed
conditions doctrine. The original Restatement of Property requires that
the conditions have "so changed since the making of the promise as to
make it impossible to secure in a substantial degree the benefits
intended to be secured by the performance of the promise."35 9 Most
cases do require that the change of conditions have an impact within the
burdened estate.36 As to the assessment of the impact of the changes,
" Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 39. "Restrictive covenants will not be enforced
where the property and neighborhood have, since the making of the restrictive covenants, so
changed in character and environment that . . . the object of the restrictions could not be
accomplished by their enforcement...." Van Sant v. Rose 103 N.E. 194, 199 (Il. 1913).
... Chase, supra note 3, § 6.05[6][b], at 6-124.
"' French, supra note 2, at 1302.
357 Harris v. Pease 66 A.2d 590, 592 (Conn. 1949). See also Chase, supra note 3, §
6.05[6][b], at 6-125; French, supra note 2, at 1302 n.204.
3- 3 TIFFANY SUPPLEMENT, supra note 126, § 875, at 380 (citing Rofe v. Robinson,
329 N.W.2d 704 (Mich. 1982), and Redevelopment Comm'n of Greensboro v. Ford, 313 S.E.2d
211 (N.C. App. 1984)). What is meant by this is that a shift to a less restrictive zoning regime is
not enough to warrant termination. Where the zoning, however, is made more restrictive, so that
it precludes the existing valid use of the land, the situation is different. See Orange & Rockland
Utils. v. Philwald Estates, 418 N.E.2d 1310, 1315 (N.Y. 1981), where the court invalidated a
restrictive covenant on the basis that the only limited use allowed by the restriction was no longer
permitted by city because of re-zoning, and servient landowners were still required to pay taxes and
maintain property for the benefit of servitude holders.
... RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 564 (1944).
'See Chase, supra note 3, § 6.05[6][b], at 6-124 (citing Trustees ofColumbia College
v. Thatcher, 87 N.Y. 311 (1882)).
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courts have employed both demanding and relaxed standards. 6'
Nonetheless, a sizable number have followed the language of the
Restatement.362 In applying the doctrine courts have not lost sight of
the fact that restrictive servitudes are valuable rights and their
enforcement should not be denied absent a clear showing of substantial
and permanent change to the burdened area.
3 63
Two open space restriction cases provide a good analogy for
modem conservation servitudes. In both instances, the court applied a
difficult standard for application of the changed conditions doctrine,
and in both cases attempts to utilize the doctrine failed. In Bates
Manufacturing Company v. Franklin Company,3 " the court held that a
restriction to maintain a lot as an open park remained valid despite the
change of the region from open land to commercial development. The
changes did not alter the use of the lot itself. The court stated:
[E]quity will grant affirmative relief against restrictive
covenants by way of removal.., only when it clearly
appears that the change in the character of the
neighborhood in the immediate vicinity of the
restricted land has been so radical and permanent as to
render perpetuation of the restriction plainly unjust
because its original purpose can no longer be
accomplished.365
In Peterson v. Greenway Parks Home Owners Association,3"
the court upheld a private park use restriction held by a nonprofit
corporation (the Association) where the Association attempted to
remove the restriction and dispose of the land for commercial use. The
' Chase observed that:
Some cases state a demanding standard, requiring that the neighborhood
change be so radical as to effectively destroy the essential objects and
purposes of the plan .... Other courts, however, state a somewhat more
relaxed test, which requires that the restriction still be of substantial value
to the beneficiary of the restriction.
Chase, supra note 3, § 6.05[6][b], at 6-124.
161 See Osborne v. Hewitt, 335 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Ky. 1960) See also French, supra
note 2, at 1300 n.193.
6 Allred v. City of Huntington, 331 S.E.2d 861, 862-63 (W.Va. 1985).
'36 Bates Mfg. Co. v. Franklin Co., 218 A.2d 366 (Me. 1966).
661 Id at 368.
' Peterson v. Greenway Parks Home Owners Ass'n, 408 S.W.2d 261 (Tex.Cir.App.
1966).
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Association alleged an obligation to make productive use of the
property for the benefit of the lot owners, and that increased
development in the area warranted a sale or lease of the parcel for
commercial activity. In rejecting this argument, the court noted that the
mere fact that the parcel would be more valuable for business use did
not entitle the association to cancel the restriction. The court reasoned
that the land had been specifically dedicated for park use, and the
Association had no right to make a contrary use of the property, even
though the changed use might be more advantageous to the public.367
Though neither of these cases involve conservation servitudes
per se, both servitudes were use restrictions for open space purposes,
and both were upheld in the face of substantial change in their
respective neighboring lands. This should prove somewhat encouraging
for holders of private conservation servitudes, as the standard appears
to be strict for application of the doctrine. However, as noted by
Korngold, application of the changed conditions doctrine to
conservation servitudes may present a novel analysis, in that the benefit
of the interest may be evaluated in terms of the benefit to the public in
general, rather than to the servitude owner.36
b. Policy and Conservation Servitudes
i. Policy Favoring the Changed
Conditions Doctrine
Use of the changed conditions doctrine has been supported by
a vast number of commentators, as well as the tentative Restatement
(Third) of Property. Its ability to "modify perpetual [servitudes] has
been praised because it provides courts with the flexibility to strike 'a
balance between the pressure for redevelopment and the desire for
stability."'369 The doctrine has also been justified on the basis that it
best serves the true intent of the original parties -- that the servitude
remains valid for only as long as it continues to serve its intended
'6 Id. at 268. The court further observed that the Association could not prove that
maintenance of the park was a financial burden. Id. at 268, 269.
'u Komgold, supra note 8, at 495 n.300. This would most likely be the case where a
nonprofit organization holds a servitude pursuant to statutory authorization of the interest,
containing a declaration or finding of public benefit. This is arguably further evidenced in the
I.R.C., which requires a public purpose for federal tax deduction I.R.C. § 170(h)(3) (1996).
' Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 40-41.
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purpose.37 The changed conditions doctrine operates on a fairness
principle for the grantor of the restriction, where unforeseeable
circumstances or alterations occur, or where the grantee acts in bad
faith in refusing to allow for negotiation of the servitudes release, even
where the benefit of the restriction has been destroyed.37" ' But perhaps
most importantly, because the doctrine serves to end useless
restrictions, it provides a superior method for courts than the touch and
concern rule.372 An additional argument for replacing the touch and
concern rule with the changed conditions doctrine is that it allows a
court to invalidate a servitude when it no longer provides a benefit,
rather than having to eliminate the restriction at its creation, where the
benefit may be substantial.373
This distinction is fair to the conservation servitude holder as
well, in that the land trust has no legitimate interest in the maintenance
of a use restriction from which no benefit can be derived. Of course, in
these instances it would seem more practical for the land trust to
negotiate for the servitude's removal, so that resources may be better
spent elsewhere, rather than continue the inspection and enforcement
of a useless restriction.
ii. Policy Against the Changed
Conditions Doctrine
For ardent supporters of conservation servitudes, the primary
argument against the changed conditions doctrine is obvious:
Conservation servitudes are created in the hopes of not only
maintaining the present non-use of the land, but also to retain that non-
use in the face of future development. That such parties who negotiated
a perpetual servitude would not be able to foresee future changes
ignores the fact that this may be the express reason why one party
bargained for the agreement in the first place.374 Essentially, this
argument returns to the freedom of contract and frustration of intent
rationales, which question whether a court's decision is superior to a
private arms-length agreement that was seen by each party as promoting
" See Sterk, supra note 46, at 652 (citing Barton v. Moline Properties, 164 So. 551,
556 (Fla. 1935); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Levy, 30 A.2d 740, 743 (Md. 1943)).
"' See Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 41.




17 See Epstein, supra note 36, at 1364; Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 41.
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a mutual benefit.3" This argument has received support from state
legislatures. 76
3. Reaction to Perpetual Servitude Enforcement
Beyond application of doctrines such as changed conditions,
there have been some notable trends in courts' responses to perpetual
restrictions on land use. Where there is no statutory provision limiting
the duration of these interests, 77 courts have "demonstrated greater
willingness to enforce servitudes that include self-contained durational
limits ... .371 Where a servitude does not expressly limit its duration,
courts will grant enforcement where the original purpose of the
agreement is still viable, and the purpose is reasonable given the
circumstances." 0 Of course, in the case of conservation servitudes, it
can be argued that such interests, absent application of the changed
conditions doctrine, require perpetual duration .3 " Where servitudes
express an intent to run in perpetuity, courts have generally responded
in one of two ways:38 ' By implying a time limit3 .2 or by simply
refusing to enforce the servitude. 83 In addition, courts have refused to
enforce conservation servitudes where they are determined to be fatally
ambiguous."' This is typically due to poor drafting that fails to define
the actual property restricted, or fails to define the obligations and
31 Epstein, supra note 36, at 1364-65.
" The Iowa Code specifically exempts scenic easements from the changed conditions
doctrine. IOWA CODE ANN. § 308.4 (West. Supp. 1996). See Thomas, supra note 29, § 62.18,
at 526.
37 Thomas, supra note 29, § 62.17, at 524. "Legislation terminating servitudes may
address the broad public policy implications of antiquated restrictions that obstruct beneficial
development patterns or it may serve narrow private interests of influential politicians." Id.
171 Sterk, supra note 46, at 654 n. 174 (citing Eagle Enters. v. Gross, 349 N.E.2d 816,
819-20 (N.Y. 1976), wherein the court refused to enforce a covenant, in part because no outside
limitation had been placed on the obligation).
179 See 3 TiFFANY SUPPLEMENT, supra note 126, § 870, at 370, 3 T)FiANY, supra note
88, § 870, at 508.
38"See Baldwin, supra note 14, at 118 ("[Perpetuity] of conservation easements has
been recognized by the Supreme Court, and the tax code, as necessary to achieve the conservation
goal." (Citing North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 318 (1983); I.R.C. § 170(h)(1); (2)
(1996))..
38 Komgold, supra note 8, at 479.
382 d. at 480 (citing Cruciano v. Ceccarone, 133 A.2d 911 (Del. Ch. 1957); Acopian
v. Hayley, 387 So.2d 999 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)).
' Id (citing Hall v. American Oil Co., 504 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)).
3' See Parkinson v. Board of Assessors, 481 N.E.2d 491 (Mass. 1985) (court refused




rights of the parties." 5
M. THE ROLE OF STATUTES
In response to the traditional common law hostility, "[n]ew
categories of statutory servitudes have arisen to address [the] flaws for
specified classes of restrictions, primarily restrictions serving
environmental purposes."3"6 Although two general goals have been
enhanced by these efforts-open space or natural area conservation and
farmland preservation - a variety of general and specific protections
have arisen under the impetus of legislative initiative." 7 Though each
state statute has its own unique purpose and effect, there are several
general themes and rules that run throughout the enactments.
A. An Overview of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act
The Uniform Conservation Easement Act. 8 has provided
guidance to state legislatures and has been adopted in several states.389
The Uniform Act purposefully labels the conservation servitude interest
as an "easement. ' ' 90 As noted by Blackie, this was intentional on the
part of the drafters, for even though they sought to supersede many of
the traditional common law hostilities associated with negative
restrictions on land use, they intended "to retain only those common
law disabilities associated with easements."39' Nonetheless, the
Uniform Act has been said to cure many of the common law hurdles to
in gross servitudes.3 92 The basis for this approach is an understanding
s See id.; Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 22 n.95.
nT Thomas, supra note 29, § 62.18, at 526.
"' See id at § 62.19. These statutes have sought to protect general qualities, such as
scenic highway easements [605 ILL.COMP. STAT. 5/4-201.15 (1991)] and scenic urban waterways
[WIS. STAT. § 30.275 (1989-90)]; as well as specific areas such as the Columbia River Gorge [OR.
REv. STAT. § 196.125 (1991)], and the Connecticut River [CNN. GEN. STAT. § 25-102(t) (1990)].
'a Uniform Conservation Easement Act (West Supp. 1995) [hereinafter "Uniform
Act"].
389 See Uniform Conservation Easement Act (West Supp. 1995) (Table of Jurisdictions
Where Act Has Been Adopted). To date, at least 18 states have adopted the Uniform Act.
390 Blackie, supra note 49, at 1196. Beyond using the term 'easement', the drafters
provide that: "a conservation easement may be created, conveyed, recorded, assigned, released,
modified, terminated, or otherwise altered or affected in the same manner as other easements."
Uniform Conservation Easement Act § 2(a) (West Supp. 1995).
"' Blackie, supra note 49, at 1195. Blackie notes that, in example, the drafters
probably sought to do away with both the changed conditions doctrine and the prohibition of an
in gross interest running with the land.
392 Hegi, supra note 70, at 126 (citing to Commissioner's comment to Uniform
Conservation Easement Act § 4 (2) (West Supp. 1995).
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by the drafters that the conservation easement is valid even though its
precise character has not been formerly recognized by the common
law.
3 93
The Uniform Act does not expressly label the interest
appurtenant or in gross, but does state that a "conservation easement is
valid even though it is not appurtenant, is assignable, is not traditionally
recognized at common law, imposes a negative burden, does not touch
or concern real property, and is without privity of estate or contract."1
394
The Uniform Act allows for unlimited duration of the interest,395 but
does not restrict "a court's ability to modify or terminate a conservation
easement."396 Though the Uniform Act dictates that the interest should
be characterized as an easement, it allows applicable state easement law
to define the exact nature of the interest where the Act fails to explicitly
do so.""
Essential to the validity of the interest defined by the Uniform
Act is the public nature of the conservation easement. Allowing land
trusts or governmental entities to "own" the interest does not intrude
upon this purpose, as neither obtains any individual or discrete benefit
that does not also inure to the public as a whole.39
B. State Statutes
The majority of states have enacted some form of legislation for
preservation or conservation purposes. Conservation servitude
legislation effectuates the original purpose of the agreement-to allow
.9 Uniform Conservation Easement Act § 4(3) (West Supp. 1995). "Thus, the drafters
have made clear that although the character of a conservation easement may have precluded its
recognition in seventeenth century England, the interest should be considered an easement by
modern courts." Blackie, supra note 49, at 1199.
I94 Jordan, supra note 7, at 408 (citing to Uniform Conservation Easement Act § 4 (1) -
(7) (West Supp. 1995)). The Uniform Act, despite explicitly labeling the term an easement,
addresses issues such associated with covenants and equitable servitudes (such as the touch and
concern' test) as well. Id.
"I' Uniform Conservation Easement Act § 2(c) (West Supp. 1995). The Uniform Act
notes that the parties themselves may set the duration of the interest.
36 Blackie, supra note 49, at 1196 (citing to Uniform Conservation Easement Act §
3(b) (West Supp. 1995)).
"I "[The drafters] add that enactment of the Uniform Act'leaves intact the existing case
and statute law of adopting states as it relates to the modification and termination of easements.'"
Blackie, supra note 49, at 1196 (citing to Uniform Conservation Easement Act § 3 cmt. (West
Supp. 1995)). However, Blackie notes that it is clear that "while the applicability of the doctrine
clearly is left to the adoptingjurisdiction, the applicable law is the jurisdiction's law of easements,
not covenants and equitable servitudes." Id
9 See Blackie, supra note 49, at 1201. See also Prefatory Note Uniform Conservation
Easement Act (West Supp. 1995).
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private landowners to voluntarily restrict the use of their property, "in
a stable manner free from common law impediments. '3 9 These efforts
have arisen from recognition of increased public support for private
initiative and management in conservation efforts,4"o specifically in the
form and nature of conservation servitudes.4°0 States have utilized
conservation and preservation servitudes "to achieve a variety of public
goals."40 2
Statutes have been enacted to address the unique needs and
characteristics of the individual states, 3 including "scenic, open space,
conservation, preservation or agricultural preservation purposes."4
°4
However, most statutes show one common characteristic: "[T]he
simplification and clarification of common law doctrines so that
understandable and enforceable property interests can be created."" °
Conservation easement statutes typically address the same fundamental
issues associated with less-than-fee interests, including "the definition
and categorization of the interest created; who can acquire such
interests; the method of acquisition; the method of recordation
requirements; the enforceability and assignability of the interest;
duration and termination."4°6
As required under common law, statutory conservation
easements must be created by express agreement.4"7 To ensure public
benefit, and "[d]ue to tax ramifications and durational concerns,
qualified easement holders are usually restricted to governmental
entities or non-profit organizations.""05 As the interest is a creature of
'9 Atherton, supra note 96, at 67. "Statutes have been enacted in many jurisdictions
to avoid the common law strictures against benefits in gross." French, supra note 33, at 942 n.52.
"' See Jordan, supra note 7, at 408.
401 "The state enactments are indicative of an increased public awareness of the
conservation and preservation values inherent in the less-than-fee acquisition programs facilitated
by the statutes." Hamilton, supra note 24, at 513-14.
2 Jordan, supra note 7, at 409.
'03 Hamilton, supra note 24, at 511. "Even among states which substantially follow the
[Uniform Act], tailoring of the statute to meet the needs and goals of each state has produced a
variety of diverse provisions." Jordan, supra note 7, at 409 n.39.
4' Atherton, supra note 96, at 62.
4" Id. at 63.
46 Hamilton, supra note 24, at 5 11-12. Hamilton notes that part of the reason such
statutes resemble one another is that often adoption of such a statute is done by copying another
state's statute, or by modeling it after the Uniform Act. Id. at 512 n. 165.
4w Atherton, supra note 96, at 64. Examples include: "purchase, gift, grant, bequest,
devise, lease, or eminent domain." id. See VA. CODE. ANN. § 10.1-1009 (Michie 1996).
4 Atherton, supra note 96, at 64. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 7, § 6901(1) (1996)
(limiting holders of conservation servitudes to governmental entities and charitable "corporations,"
"associations", and "trusts"). See also I.R.C. § 170(h)(3) (1996). Atherton notes the primary
reason for this restriction is to ensure that a grantor of such an easement is not trying to merely
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statute, the exact form of the servitude may vary between jurisdictions,
and exhibit traits of any or all servitude interests-easement, covenant,
or equitable servitude.4"9
A statute may expressly abolish requirements of appurtenance
or touch and concern, providing for enforcement of a conservation
servitude even though it does not benefit an identifiable parcel of land,
allowing its burden to run with the land and enabling enforcement
against subsequent owners of the burdened property.410 Statutes may
also contain specific provisions that provide an express right of
transfer.4"
Statutes may formulate durational requirements either by
specifying a minimum period of years in which the servitude may be
enforced,41 2 or allowing the interest to run in perpetuity." 3 The
legislation may also address enforcement by specifying the nature of the
remedy available, and the parties who may seek it.4" 4 Finally,
termination of these interests may also be covered by legislation.
Certain states allow for the conservation servitude to be terminated "in
the same manner as other easements,"415 while other statutes specify the
allowable methods of termination. Typically, these include: eminent
domain, marketable title acts," 6 foreclosure by pre-existing lien,
changed conditions, release, abandonment, or express agreement.41'
In addition to these fundamental issues, statutes may also create
ancillary provisions or processes for conservation servitudes. Some
states, in order to ensure the adequacy of the public purpose so that the
interests will remain enforceable, 45 require "mandatory procedures for
avoid property tax liability. Id.
,o Atherton, supra note 96, at 63.
10ld at 62. See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1 - 1014 (Michie 1996).
41 See Hegi, supra note 70, at 125. Hamilton, supra note 24, at 514.
42 Atherton, supra note 96, at 65 (citing in example MONT. CODE ANN. §76-6-202
(1983)).
413 Atherton, supra note 96, at 65. See W. VA. CODE § 20 - 12 - 4(c) (1996).
4'4 Atherton, supra note 96, at 65. See also Dana & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 32. Dana
& Ramsey note that "[slome statutes contain no provisions relating to enforcement, in which case
courts would presumably validate the original intent of the parties, upholding third party
enforcement if the conservation easement agreement so provides." Id.
"' Baldwin, supra note 14, at 118.
116 Generally, marketable title acts require a holder of a servitude to re-record its interest
periodically (i.e. every ten years) in order to retain the restriction. Some conservation easement
statutes specifically exempt conservation servitudes from the purview of these acts. Dana &
Ramsey, supra note 9, at 20.
"' See Baldwin, supra note 14, at 118-20; Atherton, supra note 96, at 65.
41 The statute may require that the conservation servitude remain in the hands of the
nonprofit organization or public entity, rather than allow assignment or transfer of the 'benefif to
third parties. Further, the statute may allow for enforcement by third parties where the original
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review and approval of such agreements by public bodies prior to their
recording."419 Additionally, a statute may establish a separate recording
process or set of records of the interest to improve the availability of
notice of the restriction to subsequent purchasers of the burdened
land.420
C. Federal Statutes
Conservation motives are evident at the national level as well.
The Internal Revenue Code provides a tax deduction for a "qualified"
conservation contribution.4 1  To obtain favorable tax treatment, the
servitude must be granted in perpetuity, and be a use restriction on the
property that furthers a "conservation purpose.,1 22 Further, the recently
enacted Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 provides an additional tax benefit
by adding a new provision to the tax code423 which allows, subject to
certain conditions, a federal estate tax exclusion of up to forty percent
of the value of land to a qualified conservation easement.424
In addition, federal legislation such as the Wetlands Reserve
Program4 25 and the Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act 426 provide for
federal acquisition of conservation easements for habitat protection.
These easements have been successfully enforced against private
landowners as well as state statutes attempting to limit their
establishment and duration.427 However, at present there is no federal
legislation for private acquisition and maintenance of perpetual
conservation servitudes.
holder of the servitude may not be able to do so (i.e. where a nonprofit has insufficient funds).
Netherton, supra note 41, at 557.
419 Id.
420Id at 565.
421 I.R.C. § 170(h) (1996).
4- I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (1996). Blackie notes that "[t]he strength of public policy
favoring conservation easements is evidenced also by [tax] provisions for reduced property
assessments." Blackie, supra note 49, at 1202.
423 I.R.C. § 203 1(c) (1998).
424 Id.
4- 16 U.S.C.A. § 3837 (1996).
426 16 U.S.C.A. § 718d(c) (1996).
427 See United States v. Albrecht 496 F.2d 906 (8 Cir. 1974), where the court held that
the federal interest in acquiring rights to property for waterfowl protection was stronger than state
law which would have precluded granting the federal government the benefit of an easement
requiring landowners not to drain their property. See also North Dakota v. United States, 460
U.S. 300 (1983); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
1997-98]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
D. Summary
The legislatively-created conservation servitude "arguably is an
entirely new type of property interest that does not fit into the
traditional categories of easement, real covenant, and equitable
servitude.""42  Nonetheless, legislative enactments are formal
declarations of public policy. Hamilton observed that conservation
servitude legislation represents "public dissatisfaction with the
impediments that traditional common law property interpretations may
present to the achievement of important developing public goals."429 As
noted by Blackie, "the passage of enabling statutes is evidence of a
rejection ofpolicy favoring development over nondevelopment, at least
with regard to land burdened by conservation easements.""43 Yet in
jurisdictions that lack legislative validation of conservation servitudes,
the uncertainties of the common law remain and cannot be ignored.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the numerous issues existent in the common law,
conservation servitudes remain a viable instrument for land preservation
efforts. While common law doctrines do not present an insurmountable
barrier to their validity and enforcement, legitimate concerns remain
regarding the inability of existing law to consistently adjudicate private
agreements pertaining to land use. This incongruity reflects attempts
by the courts to resolve discordant policy implications in the absence
of a legislative mandate. 3' Modem conservation servitudes, though
maintaining public support and character, cannot escape their common
law heritage.432
In essence, the difficulty is in applying antiquated doctrines to
contemporary goals. The fundamental problems with the law of
servitudes "lie in the overlapping doctrines, the obsolete terminology,
429 Blackie, supra note 49, at 1193.
429 Hamilton, supra note 24, at 514.
... Blackie, supra note 49, at 1201.
4' As recognized by Netherton: "Sound management and use of land resources calls
for balancing the freedom of choice in selecting land uses and stability in the resulting patterns of
land use. Real property law rules affect both these factors...." Netherton, supra note 41, at 555.
" The inherent character of conservation servitudes as a "public interest" has made it
especially difficult for courts to objectively "balance" all of the competing interests. As noted by
Dana & Ramsey: "Because the benefits of scenic views, open space, and environmental
preservation accrue to a diffuse public, the benefits are difficult to quantify." Dana & Ramsey,




and the oblique approaches to problems that it has retained from the
past."433 Chaotic application of entrenched doctrines impairs the
integrity of the law, as well as the policies it seeks to protect. It is
precisely this assortment of confused approaches and formless
requirements that have led toward the creation of statutory enactments
and the proposed restatement of the law of servitudes. These recent
efforts resolve many of the difficult policy implications raised by
conservation servitudes.
Though the proposed Restatement (Third) of Property
substantially reformulates the relevant inquiry for servitudes, it does so
"at the operational level where principles are translated into practice
and the details of implementation are elaborated, rather than at the level
of fundamental principles and the essential character of servitudes
law."434  Indeed, the new Restatement has the virtue of precise
application, along with a recognition of modem values and practice.
Both of these characteristics are currently missing in the common law.
In addition, the new Restatement breaks free from blind adherence to
the old doctrines without opening the values and use of land to
unrestrained volition.
In viewing the summary of policies from both law and society,
conservation servitudes clearly impede only one operating principle of
property law: Unrestrained use of land. Yet this is the one facet of
servitudes law that is now afforded the least amount of deference. As
land itself, and all its inherent qualities, is becoming a limited resource,.
stronger policies support its wise use and management. Part of this
rational use includes interests such as conservation servitudes.
Whether the proposed Restatement will take hold in the law is
yet to be seen. Certainly those jurisdictions that have largely
abandoned the old doctrines through their own initiative will have
further declaratory evidence to support their transformation. Statutes
add to this movement and may eliminate altogether the necessity of
common law reform. Nonetheless, land trusts will continue to take
their chances. Sometimes the odd number wins.
... French, supra note 2, at 1303-04.
... Susan F. French, Tradition and Innovation in the New Restatement of Servitudes:
A Report From Midpoint, 27 CONN. L. REV. 119, 120 (1994).
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